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Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan S. Masur†
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Virtually every law makes people’s lives better in some ways 
but worse in others.  For example, a clean-air law could make people 
healthier, but it could also force them to pay more money for the 
products they buy.1
 To answer that question, there needs to be a way of comparing 
seemingly incommensurable things like health and buying power.  
Two possible ways exist.  The first is to ask how much money people 
are willing to pay for benefits like improved health.  Suppose, for 
example, it could be determined that people are willing to pay $100 
more per year in return for the health benefits of cleaner air.  Those 
benefits could then be compared, by this first approach, to increased 
consumer costs. 
  Every proposed law thus raises the question: 
would its benefits outweigh its costs? 
 This approach is called cost-benefit analysis (CBA), and it has 
long been the dominant method for evaluating government policy.  
Moreover, it is the only systematic method that has ever been used for 
comparing the positive and negative effects of prospective laws and 
regulations.  Every major regulation must, by law, be evaluated via 
CBA.2  This has been the case since 1981, when President Reagan 
mandated it by executive order.3  That order has been reaffirmed by 
every President since, including Presidents Clinton4 and Obama.5
                                                          
† Associate Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; Assistant 
Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law; and Assistant Professor and Herbert and 
Marjorie Fried Teaching Scholar, University of Chicago Law School; respectively.  
 
1 The reason is that businesses may have to spend more money to produce their 
products in a way that avoids polluting.  If so, then someone must bear that cost and 
have less buying power as a result.  It may be consumers (via higher prices), 
employees (via lower wages or job cuts), or business owners (via lower profits); but 
it must be someone. 
2 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
3 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note 
at 431-434 (1982), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 745-749 (2006). 
4 Exec. Order No. 12, 866, 3 C.F.R. 634 (1994) , reprinted as amended in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 note at 745-749 (2006). 
5 Supra note 2. 
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 Despite CBA’s preeminence, however, it has been criticized 
harshly from the moment of its inception6 to the present day,7 and 
countless times in between.8  More often than not, the criticisms are 
scathing.9  Indeed, even CBA’s most prominent defenders have 
written entire books and major articles prompted by their own 
acknowledgments of CBA’s flaws.10
One example of those flaws is that the amount of money 
someone is willing to pay for a benefit like clean air depends in large 
part on the person’s wealth.  This “wealth effect” radically skews 
every cost-benefit analysis of a proposed regulation, yet CBA has no 
means of taking it into account.
 
11
                                                          
6 Steven A. Kelman, Cost Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5 REGULATION 
33 (1981). 
  Another flaw is that CBA’s 
methodology requires learning how much money people would pay to 
reduce low-probability risks such as a 1-in-10,000 risk of death.  
7 Alexander Volokh, Rationality or Rationalism?: The Positive and Normative 
Flaws of Cost Benefit Analysis, 48 HOUSTON L. REV. 79 (2011). 
8 E.g., Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 
29 COLUM. J. ENV. L. 191 (2004); Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost Benefit Analysis So 
Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 913 (2000) (evaluating the various objections to 
cost-benefit analysis); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L.REV. 941 (1999); 
Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1998); David M. 
Driesen, The Societal Cost of  Environmental Regulation: Beyond Administrative 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545 (1997); Daniel Kahneman & Jack 
Knetsch, Valuing Public Goods: The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction, 22 J. ENVTL. 
ECON. & MGMT. 57 (1992); Thomas O. McGarity, Media Quality, Technology and 
Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, 46 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROB. 159, 179-91 (1983); Duncan Kennedy, Cost- Benefit Analysis of 
Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981). 
9 E.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS 234 (2004) (“Cost-
benefit analysis of health and environmental policies trivializes the very values that 
gave rise to those policies in the first place.”); Kennedy, supra note 8, at 388 (“[T]he 
program of generating a complete system of private law rules by application of the 
criterion of efficiency is incoherent.”). 
10 RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: 
HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR 
HEALTH (2008); MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999). 
11 E.g., infra Part III.A.2. 
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Every life-saving regulation requires of CBA this calculation, but 
people’s brains are demonstrably ill-equipped to make it.12
Along these lines, an important if subsidiary contribution of 
this Article is to combine our own criticisms of CBA with those of 
others in order to make the case that CBA is an inadequate tool of 
policy analysis.
 
13
 Yet it survives.  No policymaker has seriously considered 
abandoning CBA, even though its use has been lamented almost 
universally for thirty years.  The reason for its survival is evident and 
voiced often: no alternative exists.
  The only method ever used to compare laws’ pluses 
and minuses—the method that has been mandated for the past three 
decades—is fundamentally flawed. 
14
 In this Article, we propose an alternative method for 
comparing the positive and negative consequences of a law.  This 
method, which we label “well-being analysis” (WBA), would analyze 
directly the effect of costs and benefits on people’s quality of life.  For 
example, clean-air laws would be assessed by comparing how much 
more people would enjoy their lives if they became healthier with how 
much less they would enjoy their lives if their buying power were 
reduced.  This is the most natural and direct way to put seemingly 
incommensurable things on the same scale.  And it yields the specific 
answer that is needed: whether a law will make people’s actual 
experience of life better or worse on the whole. 
  Since any law will create both 
good and bad consequences, the only way to decide whether to enact it 
is to weigh the good against the bad.  Asking how much people are 
willing to pay for the good, and thereby converting all consequences 
into dollar figures, is viewed as the lone option. 
 Until now, this sort of direct assessment has been assumed to 
be impossible.  But it has been made feasible by the emergence of a 
                                                          
12 Id.; Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 
112 YALE L.J. 61, 73-74 (2002) (“For most of us, most of the time, the relevant 
differences—between, say, 1/100,000 and 1/1,000,000—are not pertinent to our 
decisions, and by experience we are not well equipped to take those differences into 
account.”). 
13 Infra Parts III, IV, V.  Those Parts also advance our primary objective, which 
is to show the superiority of the alternative we propose.  In contrasting the two 
methods, we consider not only CBA as it is now practiced but also the proposed 
improvements in it that have been advanced by CBA’s defenders. 
14 REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 10; ADLER & POSNER, supra note 10.  One 
of us has argued to this effect before.  See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, 
Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2010). 
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new field within social science known as hedonic psychology.  
Hedonics is the study of how people experience their lives, and in 
particular the measurement of how much any factor improves or 
worsens that experience.  Originally, some critics questioned whether 
hedonic studies could credibly measure the quality of people’s 
experiences.15  But over the past fifteen years, such critics have been 
quieted by the success of these studies in producing replicable results 
that pass social science’s rigorous tests of validity.16
Accordingly, there have been widespread calls for the findings 
of hedonic psychology to be used to inform government policy.  The 
United Nations General Assembly recently passed a resolution urging 
countries “to pursue the elaboration of additional measures that better 
capture the importance of the pursuit of happiness and well-being . . . 
with a view to guiding their public policies.”
 
17  This view has also 
been endorsed by Great Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron,18 
France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy,19 three widely divergent winners 
of the Nobel Prize in Economics,20 and a recent president of Harvard 
University.21
                                                          
15 Daniel Kahenman et al., Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced 
Utility, 112 Q. J. ECON. 375, 379 (1997) (“The view that hedonic states cannot be 
measured because they are private events is widely held . . . .”). 
 
16 Infra Part II.B. 
17 G.A Res. 65/309,  U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/309 (July 19, 2011).  The resolution 
contrasted such new measures with “the gross domestic product indicator,” which 
“was not designed to and does not adequately reflect the happiness and well-being of 
people in a country.”  Id. 
18 Roger Cohen, The Happynomics of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011. 
19 Henry Samuel, Nicolas Sarkozy Wants to Measure Economic Success in 
“Happiness,” THE TELEGRAPH, Sept. 14, 2009. 
20 They are Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Daniel Kahneman.  JOSEPH E. 
STIGLITZ, AMARTYA SEN & JEAN-PAUL FITOUSSI, REPORT BY THE COMMISSION ON 
THE MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS (2009); 
Daniel Kahneman & Robert Sugden, Experienced Utility as a Standard of Policy 
Evaluation, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 161 (2005). 
21 DEREK BOK, THE POLITICS OF HAPPINESS (2010).  In legal scholarship, Adam 
Kolber has done pioneering work in elucidating the value that experiential measures 
can bring to the law.  E.g., Adam Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 
EMORY L.J. 585, 588 (2011) (“My central claim is that as new technologies emerge 
to better reveal people’s experiences, the law ought to do more to take these 
experiences into account.”).  Kolber has focused more on neuroscientific measures 
than on those of hedonic psychology, and more on the civil and criminal justice 
systems than on administrative rulemaking, but he places the same emphasis on 
experiential measurement that we endorse here and throughout our work. 
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 In order to make this a reality, however, a methodology must 
be created for using the data from hedonic psychology to evaluate 
prospective laws.22  We create such a methodology in this Article, and 
we show how it can be used to analyze the same regulations currently 
assessed by CBA.23  We then explain how the flaws of CBA, some of 
which have long been recognized and others of which we expose here, 
would be corrected by WBA.24
 Policymaking and social science are not like mathematics, and 
thus any tool of theirs will have imperfections.  WBA is no exception, 
as we acknowledge in the ensuing parts.  However, WBA cures most 
of the largest problems of CBA without introducing any new problems 
of comparable impact.  It is capable of implementation right away, and 
even in its infancy can be expected to produce more accurate analyses 
than the ones CBA now produces after three decades of refinement.  
We demonstrate this point directly by using WBA to reengineer an 
actual CBA that was used to assess a clean-water regulation.
 
25
In Part I, we provide an overview of CBA and its 
methodology.  In Part II, we explain how WBA would work in 
practice and the data upon which it would rely.  In doing so, we 
contrast an actual CBA with a prototype of a WBA for the same 
regulation.  The following parts address the major problems with CBA 
that undermine its reliability and validity, and they suggest how WBA 
solves these problems.  Part III addresses the shortcomings of CBA’s 
use of stated and revealed preferences as proxies for well-being, Part 
IV focuses on limitations in the way that CBA defines the value of 
life, and Part V addresses issues associated with discounting the value 
of future money.  At each step, we explain the ways in which WBA 
would overcome CBA’s shortcomings and provide a more accurate 
accounting of a prospective policy’s effects on the quality of life. 
 
                                                          
22 See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Welfare 
as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583, 1628-41 (2010); Anthony Vitarelli, Note, 
Happiness Metrics in Federal Rulemaking, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 115, 133 (2010) 
(“Despite the proliferation of these metrics, a core challenge remains — creating a 
useful translation between the happiness measures and traditional measures of 
economic cost.”).  Vitarelli suggests that hedonic metrics be used to supplement 
cost-benefit analysis.  Although we take a somewhat more optimistic view of the 
hedonic measures and a somewhat more pessimistic view of CBA than he does, this 
Article answers his call for a way to use the hedonic metrics to evaluate regulations. 
23 Infra Part II. 
24 Infra Parts III, IV, V. 
25 Infra Part II.C. 
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I.  HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS WORKS 
 
How do elected officials and regulators decide what laws to 
make?  They are surely influenced by political considerations,26 and 
they may also have ideological commitments.  But at least in some 
cases, they simply want to make good policy.  And even when politics 
or ideology constrains a choice, a range of acceptable options typically 
remains.27  Accordingly, regulators and elected officials and their 
staffs devote substantial time to identifying which policies are worth 
undertaking.28
Before they even begin, they must define what makes a policy 
worthwhile.  A metaphysically correct definition of worth, if such a 
thing exists, may be beyond humanity’s current grasp.  However, there 
is widespread agreement that improving the quality of human life is at 
least an important component.  Because virtually everyone deems it 
desirable to make people’s lives better, at least when all else is equal, 
that has become the primary focus of policy analysis.
 
29
In a previous article, we argued that a person’s quality of life—
or, as it is more commonly labeled in economics, “welfare” or “well-
being”—is simply the sum of the positive and negative feelings she 
experiences throughout her lifetime.
  What it means 
to make someone’s life better is, in turn, a potentially difficult 
question. 
30  This view differs from those 
held by some economists (who view welfare as preference-
satisfaction—i.e., getting what one wants) and some philosophers 
(who view welfare as the attainment of certain objective qualities or 
capabilities).31
                                                          
26 Examples of such considerations would be pleasing their constituents and 
campaign donors, even in cases where doing so is at odds with the public good. 
  Importantly, however, the different conceptions of 
27 At a minimum, it is useful to know what the best policy would be before 
deciding how to weigh that consideration against others. 
28 E.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic 
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1514 (1992) (describing the civic republican model 
as one in which “government’s primary responsibility is to enable the citizenry to 
deliberate about altering preferences and to reach consensus on the common good”). 
29 Adler & Posner, supra note 10, at 177. 
30 Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 22, at 1590-95.  We use the 
terms “welfare” and “well-being” interchangeably throughout this Article. 
31 Id. at 1601-1627. 
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welfare overlap in practice far more than they diverge.32
 
  The 
question, then, is not what it means to make life better, but rather how 
to decide which policy would do so. 
A. CBA and Welfare 
  
Understanding whether a regulation does, in fact, improve the 
quality of life is often difficult.  In rare instances, a new policy may 
improve the lives of a group of people without negatively impacting 
others.33  In almost every case, however, the benefits of a regulation to 
one group of people will come at the expense of costs borne by 
another group of people.34  Policymakers thus need a tool that can tell 
them whether a proposed law or regulation would improve the overall 
quality of human life.  Would it help those who benefit more than it 
would hurt those who are harmed?35
Suppose a regulation would reduce the amount of chemical 
pollution emitted into the waterways and in so doing reduce the 
number of people who die of cancer from the chemical.  In so doing, 
however, it would increase the cost of manufacturing some good, 
forcing the millions of consumers who purchase it to pay more per 
person for the good.  Whether the benefit of reducing cancer rates is 
greater than the cost of increasing the prices that consumers must pay 
 
                                                          
32 Id. at 1588, 1610, 1617.  In limited circumstances, one’s conception of 
welfare could affect whether one views cost-benefit analysis or well-being analysis 
as a better proxy for it. For example, a person might want outcome A, but only 
because she mistakenly believes that it will bring her more pleasure than outcome B.  
An economist who takes the view that she would be better off getting what she 
wants, even when her preference is based on a mistake, may be more likely than 
others to deem CBA a closer proxy for welfare than WBA.  We think most people 
reject this view.  Id. at 1617-18. 
33 We know of no such Pareto-optimal regulations. 
34 Most theories of CBA do not equate this kind of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency with 
ultimate “rightness” because factors other than wealth maximization could affect 
such rightness.  See Adler & Posner, supra note 10, at 195 (“[W]e conceive of CBA 
as a decision procedure, not as a criterion of moral rightness or goodness.”).  Still, 
learning whether a regulation would increase or decrease quality of life in the 
aggregate is widely viewed as an important part of assessing its desirability. 
35 Again, increasing overall well-being need not be the only goal of 
policymaking.  It may be weighed against considerations such as the distribution of 
well-being, as well as values independent of human well-being.  ADLER & POSNER, 
supra note 10, at 52-61; Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 22, at 1589-90.  
Because overall well-being is one important consideration, however, both CBA and 
WBA are designed exclusively to measure it. 
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depends, in part, on the respective effects of health and consumer 
purchases on human welfare. 
CBA provides a method for comparing such seemingly 
incommensurable values. Its solution is to convert all costs and 
benefits into a uniform metric, monetary value, by figuring out how 
much money people would be willing to pay for the positives that 
regulations can give them.  Via this method, an agency can monetize 
the value of health and compare it to the monetary value of consuming 
goods. 
 Imagine that the clean-water regulation would save 10 lives per 
year, but it would also drive up manufacturing costs substantially.  
Each of the 1 million consumers who purchase the affected good 
would have to pay $50 more per year to acquire that product.  CBA 
asks whether it is worth spending $50 million ($50/person × 1 million 
people) to save 10 lives.  In order to answer this question, CBA must 
place a price on the lives being saved. 
 To find out the cost people would be willing to pay for any 
type of regulatory benefit, such as avoiding the loss of life from 
cancer, CBA has two methods available.  The first is the “revealed 
preference” study.  If people have been faced with an opportunity to 
choose between some regulatory benefit or some amount of money in 
their actual lives, then CBA can simply observe which option they 
chose.  Their decision is said to reveal whether they prefer, for 
example, having more money or reducing their risk of death.  
Identifying that preference enables regulators to place a value on 
something like increased water quality, because it shows how much 
money people are willing to spend in order to minimize or eliminate a 
risk to their life.  When no revealed preferences are available, CBA 
uses a second method called “contingent valuation.”  This method 
involves distributing surveys that ask people how much they would be 
willing to pay for a benefit. 
 When analyzing actual regulations with tradeoffs like those of 
the clean-water regulation mentioned above, economists performing 
CBA would typically use the revealed preference method.  They 
would look for a real-life situation in which people have chosen 
between having more money and avoiding a low-probability risk of 
death.  Such a situation is said to arise when people decide whether to 
work in risky jobs like firefighting, and the idea is as follows.  A 
person has the choice between two jobs that are the same in every way 
except two: Job A is riskier than Job B, and in order to compensate for 
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that risk, Job A pays more than Job B.  People who choose to be 
firefighters rather than office workers are said to have willingly 
accepted a low-probability risk of death in return for the benefit of 
higher wages.  The amount of extra money that firefighters make is the 
revealed market value of risk-avoidance.  If a job with a 1-in-10,000 
annual risk of death pays $600 more annually than an otherwise 
comparable job with no risk, then the value of avoiding such a risk is 
pegged at $600.  Accordingly, society would collectively be willing to 
spend $6 million ($600 multiplied by 10,000) for each life saved.36  
Indeed, this is close to the actual number that economists employing 
CBA have produced.37
 If no revealed preference were available, then CBA would call 
for the use of a contingent valuation study.  This would entail giving 
people surveys that ask how much money they would be willing to 
spend in return for avoiding a 1-in-10,000 risk of death.  These 
surveys have also been used, for example, to learn people’s 
willingness to pay for things like preserving the lives of endangered 
species.
  A regulation that will save 10 lives is thus 
deemed to increase overall well-being if and only if it costs consumers 
a collective total of $60 million or less. 
38
  
 
B. CBA’s Drawbacks Constitute Reasons To Improve, Not 
Abandon, the Weighing of Costs and Benefits 
 
 Despite its established position as the primary tool of agency 
policymaking, CBA is rife with problems.  As we explain in detail in 
Parts III, IV, and V, the methods by which CBA generates monetary 
figures for regulatory effects exhibit a number of shortcomings that 
undermine its ability to serve as a proxy for welfare.  The consequence 
of these limitations is that there are deep fissures between the results 
                                                          
36 Avoiding the risk is worth $600, but the regulators know that a certain 
number of people will actually die without the regulation.  Therefore, they need to 
know how much society is willing to pay to save those lives.  If avoiding a 1-in-
10,000 risk is worth $600, then avoiding an actual death (i.e., a 1-in-1 “risk”) is 
worth $6 million ($600 x 10,000). 
37 E.g.,  W. Kip Viscusi, How to Value A Life, 32 J. ECON. & FIN. 311, 312–13 
(2008); see also, e.g., ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER 
RULE: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 5-28 (2000). 
38 E.g., John B. Loomis and Douglas S. White, Economic Benefits of Rare and 
Endangered Species: Summary and Meta-Analysis, 18 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 
197, 203 (1996). 
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generated by CBA and true welfare.  Accordingly, cost-benefit 
analysis has been subject to trenchant criticism and numerous 
proposals for reform.39
One way to understand the different approaches to regulatory 
analysis is to view them as four points along a spectrum.  At one end is 
traditional CBA, and at the other end are the broadest critics of CBA, 
such as Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling.
 
40  Between those 
endpoints are sophisticated efforts to tweak CBA,41
 The first thing to say on this score is that such critics 
acknowledge the necessity of analyzing and weighing likely outcomes: 
“analysis of costs and benefits . . . is an essential part of any 
systematic thought about public policy, and has always been involved 
in government decision making.  Our criticism concerns the much 
narrower doctrine of Cost-Benefit Analysis, which calls for a specific, 
controversial way of expressing and thinking about costs and 
benefits.”
 as well as WBA 
itself.  The following Parts contrast WBA with both traditional and 
refined versions of CBA, but it is worth pausing briefly here to situate 
WBA with respect to the critics who at times seem to oppose any sort 
of quantitative analysis of risk. 
42  These critics’ dissatisfaction with CBA thus jibes with the 
project of WBA: “To say that life, health, and nature are priceless is 
not to say that we should spend an infinite amount of money to protect 
them.  Rather, it is to say that translating [them] into dollars is not a 
fruitful way of deciding how much protection to give them.”43
 Despite those acknowledgments, though, the broadest critics of 
CBA at times seem to veer away from any sort of weighing or 
balancing approach, at least if such an approach involves some method 
of quantifying positive and negative outcomes.
 
44  The linchpin of 
Ackerman and Heinzerling’s proposal for replacing CBA is a 
“holistic” approach to assessing potential policies.45
                                                          
39 E.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, supra note 
  Instead of 
9; REVESZ & 
LIVERMORE, supra note 10. 
40 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9. 
41 E.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 10. 
42 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 211. 
43 Id. at 9. 
44 Id. at 234 (“[W]e must give up the idea, reassuring to many, that there is, 
somewhere, a precise mathematical formula waiting to solve our problems for us.  In 
its place, we offer an attitude rather than an algorithm.”). 
45 Id. at 210.  In addition to advocating the holistic approach, Ackerman and 
Heinzerling make three other proposals.  The first is to treat health, safety, and 
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analyzing the details of those policies, their overall costs and benefits 
would be conceived in broad terms.46
 
  To show how this would work, 
they give two examples: 
A holistic approach to the arsenic problem, for 
example, encourages us to ask whether it is worth the 
price of one or two bottles of water per person per year 
to ensure that everyone has tap water with the lowest 
possible level of arsenic. . . .  For regulations to protect 
fish from power plants, the holistic approach makes us 
think about our willingness to pay a penny a day to 
avoid an underwater massacre.47
 
 
Such questions would be addressed to the public or to elected officials, 
rather than to regulatory agencies.48
 It is not clear how this would work, however, in cases where 
the choices are not binary.  Choosing the “lowest possible” level of 
arsenic in tap water might be desirable, but in many cases some 
balance must be struck between safeguarding environmental values 
and permitting economic activity.  When choosing the level at which 
to cap emissions of particulate matter, for example, policymakers must 
seek to protect air quality without banning cars.
 
49
                                                                                                                                         
environmental regulations as moral imperatives rather than as subjects fit for zero-
sum cost analysis, id. at 216-23; the second is to err on the side of precaution when 
assessing the dangers posed by potential hazards, id. at 223-29; and the third is to 
place a high value on the well-being of future generations, id. at 229-33.  To the 
extent that Ackerman and Heinzerling would justify those three proposals on the 
ground that they are likely to increase overall well-being, those proposals could be 
pursued via WBA.  To the extent that the proposals instead embody welfare-
independent moral values, they are entirely consistent with the weak-welfarist 
approach to policymaking that we endorse.  Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, 
Welfare as Happiness, supra note 
  If there is a wide 
22, at 1589-90. 
46 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 214 (“[A]ssessment of overall 
impacts, not warring over minutiae, is what is needed to make a decision to ‘buy’ or 
not to ‘buy’ a proposed regulation.”). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 215 (“In advocating a holistic approach to weighing costs and benefits, 
we have been talking about how elected representatives and the public should think 
about health and environmental problems . . . .  Once a higher-level decision has 
been made, the agencies should carry it out, not reopen the debate.”). 
49 Cf. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, POLICY ASSESSMENT FOR THE REVIEW OF 
THE PARTICULATE MATTER NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS (2011), 
available at 
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range of options, each with a different cost, then how would that range 
be presented to the public in a holistic way?  In such cases, it is also 
not clear what role regulators are envisioned to play.50
 Whoever makes such choices, they will benefit from evidence 
of the likely effects of each option on human well-being.  WBA 
supplies that evidence, and it does so in a way consistent with the 
principles that Ackerman and Heinzerling emphasize.  It complies 
with their central decree that benefits must not be expressed in 
monetary units.
 
51  And although it relies on survey data, what is being 
surveyed is well-being itself, not willingness-to-pay, to which CBA’s 
critics object on specific grounds that are inapplicable to WBA.52  
Unlike the “opaque technicalities that characterize cost-benefit studies 
in practice,”53
 Although the external critics of CBA caution their readers to 
“remember[] how many essential values are not illuminated by . . . 
narrow-beam numerical spotlights,” they acknowledge in the same 
sentence that “[i]t is of course helpful, when evaluating broad public 
policies, to quantify everything that is measurable.”
 WBA yields direct and straightforward conclusions 
about a policy’s likely effects on the quality of people’s lives. 
54
 
  The 
breakthroughs of hedonic psychology have permitted measurement of 
well-being itself, and using that evidence to inform policymaking 
would be a major step forward. 
* * * 
 
 Over the past few decades, cost-benefit analysis has become 
one of the dominant tools of American policy and regulatory analysis.  
Its goal, in comparing the costs and benefits of a regulation, is to 
provide a rough proxy for the regulation’s overall effects on the 
                                                                                                                                         
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/pm/data/20110419pmpafinal.pdf. 
50 Ackerman and Heinzerling still conceive an important role for regulators in 
their vision of policymaking, supra note 9, at 215 (“Most important decisions about 
health and the environment are filtered through administrative agencies like EPA 
before they can take effect; general instructions from Congress are refined and 
operationalized by the agencies.”), but they do not specify in their examples how the 
respective roles of elected officials and agencies would actually play out. 
51 See id. at 212. 
52 See id. at 153-178, 213. 
53 Id. at 215. 
54 Id. at 212. 
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quality of human life.55  Although it has been criticized along a 
number of different dimensions, CBA has made important 
contributions to our understanding of the tradeoffs involved in 
complex administrative measures.  During the period of its 
development and maturation, CBA has become more sophisticated and 
rigorous.56
 
  Despite these advances, however, significant and 
intractable shortcomings remain.  As we explain throughout this 
Article, CBA involves a number of limitations that undermine its 
value as a proxy for welfare.  WBA cures many of these problems, and 
it offers the possibility of levels of analytical accuracy beyond what 
even the best versions of CBA could achieve.  We thus propose 
replacing CBA with WBA as the primary welfarist decision tool.  Part 
II outlines our proposal, including its analytic method and the data 
upon which it relies.  
II.  WELL-BEING ANALYSIS 
 
 Defenders of CBA have long argued that, despite its flaws, 
cost-benefit analysis is the best available means for determining the 
welfare effects of a project or regulation.57
Instead of monetizing the effects of regulation, WBA 
“hedonizes” them.  That is, it measures how much a regulation raises 
or lowers people’s enjoyment of life.  For example, if a regulation 
would result in improved health but higher prices of products, then 
WBA would compare how much more people enjoy their lives when 
they are made healthier with how much less they enjoy their lives 
when their buying power decreases.  Subsequent Parts of this Article 
argue that WBA solves many of the conceptual and methodological 
problems facing CBA.  This Part introduces WBA and explains the 
sources, validity, and reliability of its data. 
  That is no longer the case.  
We propose here an alternative method for analyzing regulatory 
policy: well-being analysis (WBA).  WBA shares the basic framework 
of CBA, that of comparing costs and benefits, but it differs in the data 
and analytical tools it employs to make such comparisons. 
 
                                                          
55 See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
109 YALE L.J. 165, 194-95 (1999) (suggesting that CBA is the “decision procedure 
best justified in light of overall well-being”). 
56 On the history of CBA, see REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 10, at 9-45. 
57 See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 10. 
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 A. WBA: The Basic Framework 
 
 WBA directly analyzes the effects of regulations on people’s 
quality of life.  To do that, it relies on data from hedonic psychology 
that measures how different factors affect people’s enjoyment of their 
lives.  In theory, such measures could perhaps be purely neurological 
— taken by a machine that reports how good someone feels at all 
times.  But unless and until that sort of technology is created, 
psychologists must rely instead on individuals’ personal assessments 
of how their lives are going for them at a particular moment in time.  
Fortunately, these self-assessments can be taken in ways that yield 
highly reliable results, as we explain in detail in the following section. 
Individuals’ self-assessments indicate their level of subjective 
well-being (SWB), or “happiness.”  Recently, psychologists and 
economists have developed increasingly sophisticated surveying and 
statistical methods that enable the collection and analysis of well-
being data on a large scale.58
 WBA relies on the same basic cost-benefit-weighing principle 
that undergirds CBA: all else equal, regulations whose benefits exceed 
their costs are valuable because they enhance overall welfare.  The 
main difference between the two techniques involves the way in which 
costs and benefits are calculated and compared.  Regulations involve 
both market and non-market costs and benefits.  For CBA, market 
effects are relatively easy to handle, because computing their monetary 
value is straightforward.  Non-market effects, however, are more 
difficult for CBA.  As we will describe in greater detail below, CBA 
must apply a variety of problematic tools to monetize the value of 
health, lives, and the environment.  WBA avoids many of these 
difficulties by looking directly to a regulation’s effects on people’s 
experiences and lives.  In WBA, all effects of a regulation are 
“hedonized,” which is to say that they are converted into units directly 
  WBA uses these data to evaluate the 
welfare consequences of regulations by comparing the well-being 
gains and losses of affected parties.  This section explains the 
conceptual framework behind WBA, while the following section 
discusses the data upon which WBA relies.  The final section of Part I 
explains how the data would be used in the actual performance of 
WBA. 
                                                          
58 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Preface, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel Kahneman et al., eds. 1999) [hereinafter WELL-
BEING]. 
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measuring their impact on the subjective well-being of the affected 
parties.  The positive and negative hedonic impacts can then be 
compared with one another.  They are the relevant costs and benefits. 
 Instead of converting regulatory effects into monetary values, 
WBA converts them into well-being units (WBUs).  WBUs are 
intended to be subjective, hedonic, cardinal, and interpersonally 
comparable units that indicate the degree of a person’s happiness for a 
given period of time.59  They are, in some respects, similar to the 
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) that are becoming popular in 
health economics (although Part IV describes the differences between 
the measures and the advantages of WBUs over QALYs).  WBA maps 
a person’s SWB onto a scale that runs from zero to ten, where zero 
indicates death and ten indicates perfect happiness (subjectively 
defined).  Each decile of the scale is equivalent and indicates a ten 
percent change in the person’s SWB.60  Moreover, the scale is identical 
across individuals, although, of course, the kinds of things that affect 
different individuals’ SWB may not be.61
 This type of scale has significant benefits for any type of 
decision analysis, particularly regulatory analysis, because it enables 
the direct comparison of the hedonic impact of proposed policy 
changes.  Imagine, for example, that the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) is contemplating a simple regulation 
of workplace safety that will prevent 100 workers from each losing an 
arm while on the job.  Implementing such a measure, however, will 
increase the costs of production and force factories to fire 300 workers 
in the affected industry.  
  One WBU is equivalent to 
1.0 on the scale for a period of one year.  Thus, if a person lives to the 
age of 100 and has an SWB of 7.0 for each year, that person has 
experienced 700 WBUs (7.0 WBU/year × 100 years).  If an event such 
as unemployment causes a person’s SWB to drop from 7.0 to 5.5 for a 
period of ten years, that person loses 15 WBUs (1.5 WBU/year × 10 
years). 
                                                          
59 Cf. Yew-Kwang Ng, Happiness Is Absolute, Universal, Ultimate, 
Unidimensional, Cardinally Measurable and Interpersonally Comparable: A Basis 
for the Environmentally Responsible Happy Nation Index, Monash Univ. Dept. of 
Econ. Discussion Paper 16/11, available at 
http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/eco/research/papers/2011/1611happinessabsolute
ng.pdf. 
60 This implies that the scale is intrapersonally cardinal. 
61 This implies that the scale is interpersonally cardinal.  
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 CBA would attempt to calculate the value of the regulation by 
monetizing the costs and benefits it generates.  With respect to the 
costs, CBA would in theory be able to estimate the lost wages of the 
300 unemployed people.62  The benefits, however, are trickier.  
Establishing a market price for the value of an arm is a fraught 
enterprise.  We discuss the many possible shortcomings of CBA’s 
attempts to do so in Part III.  Given these shortcomings, the value 
CBA applies to the loss of an arm will be beset by a number of 
systematic errors associated with wealth effects, labor market effects, 
and people’s poor ability to predict how events like losing an arm will 
affect them.63
 WBA would approach the measure in the same general fashion 
but with different analytical data.  Like CBA, WBA would attempt to 
quantify the cost of unemployment.  But instead of looking solely to 
the workers’ lost wages, it would calculate the hedonic cost of being 
unemployed.  Some data suggest that unemployment has a significant 
effect on long-term well-being even after workers become re-
employed.
  Accordingly, CBA may substantially and systematically 
misstate the benefits of the regulation. 
64  Thus, the welfare costs of unemployment may be much 
greater than CBA predicts.  On the other side of the ledger, WBA is 
well-positioned to hedonize the benefits of the regulation.  Studies of 
people who have lost limbs provide fairly accurate information on the 
hedonic loss associated with losing an arm (and thus the benefits of 
avoiding these losses).65  Again, the results are likely to be different 
from those determined by CBA.  Studies show that individuals who 
lose limbs often adapt substantially to their new condition, recovering 
most of their lost happiness within a few years.66
                                                          
62 In practice, however, CBA typically ignores the costs associated with 
unemployment.  Infra Part II.C. 
  This is contrary to 
the predictions of healthy people, who typically assume that such 
disabilities will be devastating and discount the possibility that they 
63 See infra Part III.  
64 See Richard E. Lucas et al., Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life 
Satisfaction, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 8 (2004).  We use this merely as an example.  Other 
hedonic data cut in a different direction, see Andreas Knabe et al., Dissatisfied with 
Life, but Having a Good Day: Time-Use and Well-Being of the Unemployed, 2009, 
available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_2604.html, and in practice WBA 
would take all of the relevant data into account.  Cf. infra Part II(c). 
65 For an excellent summary of the initial research on hedonic adaptation, see 
Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING, 
supra note 58, at 302, 311–18. 
66 Id. 
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will adapt to the loss.67  Accordingly, the welfare benefits of the 
regulation may be overstated by CBA if contingent valuation or 
revealed preference surveys rely on mispredictions about hedonic 
adaptation.68
 While this example suggests that the regulation may be less 
valuable than CBA implies, in many other circumstances WBA will 
point in the direction of much more stringent regulation than CBA 
would suggest.  For most regulations, the chief benefits will involve 
extending human lives, and the major costs will entail higher 
consumer prices.  In the context of WBA, loss of life constitutes the 
ultimate hedonic cost, whereas many studies indicate that money has a 
relatively small effect on well-being.
   
69
 
  When money is traded off 
against life, therefore, WBA is likely to favor health and safety 
regulations far more than does CBA. 
B. The Data of WBA 
 
 Social scientists have been attracted to the idea of measuring 
human welfare directly for a long time, but they have had difficulty 
securing valid and reliable data.70  WBA is now feasible because of the 
availability of relevant data about the effects of different 
circumstances on individual well-being.  Over the last decade or so, 
new social science techniques have emerged that enable researchers to 
study subjective well-being from a variety of different perspectives 
with a number of different tools.71
                                                          
67 Peter A. Ubel et al., Do Nonpatients Underestimate the Quality of Life 
Associated with Chronic Health Conditions Because of a Focusing Illusion?, 21 
MED. DECISION MAKING 190, 197 (2001); Peter A. Ubel et al., Disability and 
Sunshine: Can Hedonic Predictions Be Improved by Drawing Attention to Focusing 
Illusions or Emotional Adaptation?, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 111, 
111 (2005) [hereinafter Ubel et al., Disability and Sunshine] (“One of the most 
commonly replicated ‘happiness gaps’ is that observed between the self-rated quality 
of life of people with health conditions and healthy people’s estimates of what their 
quality of life would be if they had those conditions . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
  These techniques allow the more or 
68 See infra Part III. 
69 E.g., Daniel Kahneman & Angus Deaton, High Income Improves Evaluation 
of Life but Not Emotional Well-Being, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16,489, 16,492 
(2010). 
70 See David Colander, Edgeworth’s Hedonimeter and the Quest to Measure 
Utility, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 215 (2007). 
71 For a review of well-being measures, see ED DIENER ET AL., WELL-BEING FOR 
PUBLIC POLICY 46-66 (2009). 
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less direct measurement of people’s happiness levels, overcoming the 
problem that had initially driven economists to seek monetary proxies 
for welfare.  Importantly, they enable the measurement of what Daniel 
Kahneman has termed “experienced utility” (how good people feel) in 
contrast to the “decision utility” that is typically studied in CBA.72  
“Decision utility” measures only whether people get what they want, 
on the assumption that getting it will make them better off.  But 
because that assumption has been shown to be deeply imperfect,73
 
 
Kahneman and others have turned toward measuring directly the 
quality of people’s experience of life.  This section will briefly discuss 
a few of the most promising techniques for collecting such experiential 
data and their relative strengths and weaknesses. 
1. Life Satisfaction Surveys 
  
 The oldest method of measuring SWB is the life satisfaction 
survey.  These types of surveys ask individuals to respond to a 
question such as, “All things considered, how satisfied with your life 
are you these days?”74  Respondents answer on a scale that ranges 
from “not very happy” to “very happy.”  Life satisfaction surveys have 
been included in the U.S. General Social Survey since the 1970s; as a 
result, we now have substantial quantities of longitudinal data on 
thousands of individuals.  The principal value in such surveys is the 
ability to correlate SWB data with a variety of other facts about 
people’s lives.  Using multivariate regression analyses that control for 
different circumstances, researchers are able to estimate the strength of 
the correlations between SWB and factors such as income, divorce, 
unemployment, disability, and the death of family members.75
                                                          
72 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Back to Bentham: Explorations of Experienced 
Utility, 112 Q.J. ECON. 375, 375 (1997). 
  For 
example, on average, the death of a parent will yield the loss of 0.25 
73 E.g., infra Part III.A.3. 
74 See William Pavot & Ed Diener, Review of the Satisfaction with Life Scale, 5 
PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 164 (1993). 
75 See, e.g., Richard. E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point 
Model of Happiness: Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 527 (2003) [hereinafter “Reexamining Adaptation”]; Andrew E. 
Clark et al., Lags and Leads in Life Satisfaction: A Test of the Baseline Hypothesis, 
118 ECON. J. F222, F231 (2008); Richard A. Lucas, Time Does Not Heal All 
Wounds: A Longitudinal Study of Reaction and Adaptation to Divorce, 16 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 945 (2005). 
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life satisfaction points on a scale of 1-7 for a period of time, while the 
loss of a spouse will typically yield the loss of 0.89 points.76
 Life satisfaction surveys are relatively inexpensive to 
administer and can be easily included in a variety of larger survey 
instruments.  Accordingly, they are most valuable as sources of large-
scale data about many subjects and of longitudinal data about changes 
in SWB over time.  The latter use is especially valuable in assessing 
the causal effects of life events (such as marriage, disability, or 
unemployment) on SWB, because the same individual can be surveyed 
both before and after the event.  This eliminates the need for between-
subjects comparisons.
  
77  Life satisfaction surveys are less helpful, 
however, for assessing particularly granular changes in circumstances.  
More importantly, they rely on global judgments about how people’s 
lives are going, rather than those individuals’ moment-by-moment 
hedonic experiences.  Because hedonic experiences are often poorly 
remembered, such judgments can be biased because of a person’s 
momentary mood or the order in which questions are posed, among 
other errors.78
 
 
2. Experience Sampling Methods 
  
 Researchers sought to overcome the limitations of life 
satisfaction surveys by developing techniques that enabled them to 
more directly measure people’s emotions while they were being 
experienced.  The “gold standard” of such measures is the experience 
sampling method (ESM), which uses handheld computers and iPhones 
to survey people about their experiences.79
                                                          
76 Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Death, Happiness, and the 
Calculation of Compensatory Damages, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S217, S217 (2008). 
  Subjects are beeped 
randomly throughout the day and asked to record what they are doing 
and how they feel about it.  The data that emerge from such studies 
77 See Lucas, Reexamining Adaptation, supra note 75, at 547.  Between-subjects 
comparisons can be a problem if the two groups (e.g., married people and single 
people) differ about more than just the comparison issue.  Married people are not 
simply happier because they are married; the people who get married are more likely 
to have been happy people in the first place than the people who are single.  Id. 
78 See Alan B. Krueger et al., National Time Accounting: The Currency of Life, 
in MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING OF NATIONS 30 (Alan B. Krueger ed. 
2009). 
79 Id.  
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provide a much more detailed picture of how people spend their time 
and how their experiences affect them. 
 ESM studies can be expensive to run, so researchers have 
sought other methods that produce most of the advantages of ESM but 
at a lower price.  One such technique is the day reconstruction method 
(DRM) pioneered by Daniel Kahneman and his colleagues.  DRM 
uses daily diary entries about each day’s experiences to reconstruct an 
account of subjects’ emotional lives.  DRM studies correlate strongly 
with ESM studies and can be run at lower cost.80  Similarly, the 
Princeton Affect and Time Survey (PATS) asks subjects to report and 
evaluate their experiences from the previous day.81  It can be 
distributed via telephone and incorporated into other survey devices, 
enabling it to reach a larger population.82
    
 
3.  The Quality of the Data 
  
 The ability to generate data is not the same as the ability to 
actually measure the thing sought to be measured.  Nor is it the ability 
to measure it well.  Data are only useful if they are reliable and valid.  
Much of the remainder of this Article analyzes the reliability and 
validity of the valuation measures used by CBA.  As a means of 
comparison, we now discuss the quality of the data upon which WBA 
will rely. 
 Reliability is an indication of the consistency of a measurement 
instrument.83  For example, a scale that reported very similar numbers 
every time the same weight was placed on it would be judged highly 
reliable. In the context of well-being measures, reliability can be 
assessed by examining correlations between tests and retests of the 
same question at separate times, as well as correlations between 
different questions that ask about similar concepts.84
                                                          
80 See Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life 
Experience:  The Day Reconstruction Method, 306 SCIENCE 1776, 1776 (2004). 
  Meta-analyses of 
different well-being tools have found high levels of reliability for both 
81 Krueger et al., supra note 78, at 34-36. 
82 Id. at 36. 
83 DAVID L. STREINER & GEOFFREY R. NORMAN, HEALTH MEASUREMENT 
SCALES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND USE (4th ed. 2008). 
84 DIENER ET AL., supra note 71, at 71. 
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life satisfaction and experience sampling methods.85  This is especially 
true of more advanced multi-item measures.86
 Just because a measure reliably provides consistent data does 
not mean that it is measuring what you want it to measure.
 
87  The 
ability to actually measure the thing sought to be measured is called 
validity.88  Although a full review of the validity of well-being 
measures is unnecessary here,89 it is worth noting a number of findings 
that support the conclusion that a person’s well-being can be validly 
measured by the tools discussed above.  First, despite the rather 
different techniques used to collect data, the various measures of well-
being tend to correlate with one another.90  Overall life satisfaction is 
correlated both with the amount of positive and negative affect that a 
person feels91 and with her satisfaction with the domains of her life.92  
Not only are subjective reports of well-being correlated with one 
another, they are also correlated with external measures, such as third-
party informant reports,93 facial expressions,94 and neurological data.95
                                                          
85 Id. at 72-73.  Test-retest reliability results typically range from r = 0.55 to r = 
0.70. These are fairly high numbers especially given the difficulty of using test-retest 
calculations on a measure of well-being that is likely to change significantly over 
time. 
  
86 Id. at 74. 
87 For example, a bathroom scale may provide highly reliable data — the same 
read-out every time — but those data are probably not a very good measure of your 
well-being. 
88 Samuel Messick, Validity of psychological assessment: Validation of 
inferences from persons’ responses and performances as scientific inquiry into score 
meaning, 50 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 741, 741 (1995) (“Validity is an overall evaluative 
judgment of the degree to which empirical evidence and theoretical rationales 
support the adequacy and appropriateness of interpretations and actions on the basis 
of test scores or other models of assessment.”). 
89 For such a review, see DIENER ET AL., supra note 71, at 74-93. 
90 Id. at 70. 
91 Michael Eid & Ed Diener, Global judgments of subjective well-being: 
Situational variability and long-term stability, 65 SOC. INDICATORS RES.  245 
(2004). 
92 See Ulrich Schimmack, The Structure of Subjective Well-Being, in THE 
SCIENCE OF SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING (Michael Eid & Randy J. Larsen eds., 2007) 
115. 
93 See E. Sandvik et al., Subjective Well-Being:  The Convergence and Stability 
of Self-Report and Non-Self-Report Measures, 61 J. PERSONALITY 317 (1993); Heidi 
Lepper, Use of Other-Reports to Validate Subjective Well-Being Measures, 44 SOC. 
INDICATORS RES. 367 (1998). 
94 Tiffany A. Ito & John T. Cacioppo, The Psychophysiology of Utility 
Appraisals, in WELL-BEING, supra note 57, at 479. 
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Well-being measures also tend to be fairly stable over time and exhibit 
high test-retest reliability.96  But despite their overall stability,97 they 
are also sensitive to changes in life circumstances: people who 
experience apparently negative events do indeed report lower levels of 
well-being—at least for a time, before they adapt.98  Moreover, well-
being scales can detect the relative magnitude of life events.  For 
example, people who are more seriously injured predictably report 
lower happiness ratings than do people who are less seriously 
injured.99
 It is worth addressing an objection that is occasionally made to 
the use of self-reported well-being data.  Some economists worry that 
these survey instruments lack interpersonal cardinality because 
different individuals may interpret the scales differently.
  This suggests that people are capable of consistently 
reporting how experiences make them feel, and that their emotional 
responses generally exhibit credible and predictable patterns following 
specific events. 
100
 While some limited evidence for concern about cardinality 
exists in certain atypical contexts, methodological solutions to this 
problem are almost certainly available.  First, differential use of the 
scale will only be a problem when that differential use is related to the 
populations being compared.  For instance, imagine an agency using 
WBA to evaluate a project that will reduce traffic and commuting 
times on a highway.  In order to determine the hedonic cost of 
  That is, a 
7.0 on one person’s scale may not be the same as a 7.0 on another 
person’s scale.  If people interpret the hedonic scales differently, it 
becomes impossible to know whether one person’s reported change 
from an SWB of 6.0 to 7.0 was equivalent to another person’s reported 
change from 6.0 to 7.0.  
                                                                                                                                         
95 Id.; T.G. Dinan, Glucocorticoids and the Genesis of Depressive Illness: A 
Psychobiological Model, 164 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 365 (1994). 
96 See Ed Diener & Richard E. Lucas, Personality and Subjective Well-Being, in 
WELL-BEING, supra note 58, at 213, 214. 
97 See Sandvik, supra note 93. 
98 See Lucas et al., supra note 64. 
99 See Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 76.  This is in contrast to findings that 
people’s responses to contingent valuation surveys used in CBA display 
considerable scope neglect, i.e., they are willing to pay the same amount of money to 
save 2,000, 20,000, or 200,000 endangered birds.  See infra note 260. 
100 In fact, concerns about the interpersonal cardinality of utility pushed 
economists towards monetization in the first place. See William Nordhaus, 
Measuring Real Income with Leisure and Household Production, in MEASURING 
THE SWB OF NATIONS, supra note 78, at 125. 
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commuting in traffic, the agency would compare the well-being of 
people while they are commuting with the well-being of people who 
are not commuting.  Unless people who commute in traffic 
systematically use the hedonic scale differently from people who do 
not, different uses of the scale will simply show up as random noise.  
This randomness will wash out across large numbers of people.  In 
many of the situations most relevant to WBA, this is virtually certain 
to be the case.101
Just as CBA alternately relies upon revealed preference and 
contingent valuation studies, WBA would draw upon each of the data 
sources mentioned in the preceding section.  In some cases, 
longitudinal studies of overall well-being may provide the best data 
available for tracking people after events with potentially long-term 
effects.
   
102  These studies have been used, for example, by researchers 
to understand the hedonic impact of no-fault divorce laws on women 
in different states.103
 
  In other circumstances, the availability of ESM 
studies will enable more fine-grained analyses of regulations’ effects 
on people’s lives. 
                                                          
101 For example, whereas different uses of the scale might be an issue when 
comparing surveys conducted in different countries with different languages, it is far 
less likely to be an issue when making local or national regulatory policy.  There is 
no evidence that different populations within the United States use the scale 
differently, and in the vast majority of cases it is counterintuitive to think they would 
do so. 
Some might contend that circumstances such as disability and unemployment 
create the potential for some degree of scale re-norming.  That is, they might argue 
that ideal happiness could mean something different to a person after becoming 
seriously disabled or unemployed, and that the person might report a higher score for 
the same level of positive feeling than she would have reported before she was 
injured or unemployed.  There is no reason to believe this is true, but even if it were, 
techniques like the U-index developed by Alan Krueger, Daniel Kahneman, and 
colleagues avoid the issue of different scale usage by comparing responses only 
within-subjects.  See Krueger et al., supra note 78, at 20.  The hedonic data are 
interpreted with respect to individuals and converted into externally comparable 
numbers.  While this approach does not encompass all relevant data, it nonetheless 
constitutes an interpersonally cardinal scale. 
102 This would be the case if no comparable ESM or DRM studies had yet been 
done for the relevant conditions. 
103 See Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law:  Divorce Laws and Family Distress, 121 Q.J. ECON. 267 (2006). 
 
 
 
 
 WELL-BEING ANALYSIS VS. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 24 
C. Well-Being Analysis: An Example 
 
 How feasible is well-being analysis, and how would it differ 
from cost-benefit analysis?  In order to answer those questions, in this 
section we take an actual cost-benefit analysis conducted as part of an 
EPA regulation and recalculate the costs and benefits of the regulation 
using WBA. 
 This exercise actually stacks the deck overwhelmingly in favor 
of CBA and against WBA.  The actual CBA used here was the product 
of decades of opportunities to refine CBA, and countless millions of 
dollars spent on studying these phenomena and performing these 
analyses.  By contrast, this section constitutes the first WBA that has 
ever been conducted.  There has never been any systematic collection 
of well-being data related to any government project, much less the 
regulation we analyze here.   
For that reason, our analysis falls far short of the level of 
accuracy that could be achieved were WBA to be adopted in practice. 
Nonetheless, and strikingly, the WBA sketch we provide below yields 
results that are likely more reliable than those of the cost-benefit 
analysis that the Environmental Protection Agency itself conducted.  
This demonstrates the inherent advantages of WBA, the ease with 
which it could immediately be implemented, and the potential for truly 
impressive results of it were conducted with the resources currently 
available to CBA. 
 
1. EPA Regulation of Pulp and Paper Production: A Cost-
Benefit Analysis104
 
 
 The regulation we examine was promulgated by EPA under the 
Clean Water Act in 1998 to curb toxic effluents from pulp and paper 
mills.105
                                                          
104 Although our examples in the Introduction and first two parts have focused 
on clean air and clean water regulations for the sake of clarity and consistency, 
everything we say in this Article applies more generally to all regulations.  We 
broaden our pool of examples in Parts III, IV, and V. 
  Prior to 1998, pulp, paper, and paperboard mills used a 
105 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source 
Category: Pulp and Paper Production; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment 
Standards, and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard 
Category, 40 C.F.R. pts. 63, 261 & 430 (1998).  The regulation was upheld by the 
D.C. Circuit.  Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 557 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  One 
of us has written about this regulation before.  Masur & Posner, Against Feasibility 
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number of chlorine-based chemicals in the normal manufacturing 
process.  Dioxin and furan, two carcinogens, are among the 
byproducts that result from producing paper and paperboard with these 
chlorine-based chemicals.106
 EPA considered three regulatory options.  “Option A” required 
the mills to substitute chlorine dioxide for elemental chlorine in the 
production process, which reduces but does not eliminate the 
discharge of dioxin and furan.
  Pulp and paper mills then release those 
chemicals into the waterways in quantities great enough to sicken and 
kill fish and cause a number of diseases, including cancer, in humans 
who eat the fish. 
107  “Option B” was a stricter rule, 
combining the Option A limits and a requirement that the mills 
eliminate lignin (a material in wood pulp), along with several other 
restrictions on the manufacturing process.108  Option B would have 
resulted in even lower emissions of dioxin and furan than Option A.  
Finally, “Option TCF” (“totally chlorine free”), required that pulp and 
paper mills eliminate all chlorine from the production process, thereby 
also eliminating the discharge of furan and dioxin.109
 The EPA estimated that this regulation would produce several 
different types of benefits.  First, there would be fewer cancer deaths 
among recreational and subsistence anglers who consume fish that 
have swum near pulp and paper mills.
 
110
                                                                                                                                         
Analysis, supra note 
  The EPA refused to specify 
14; Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Regulation, 
Unemployment, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) 
(hereinafter “Regulation & Unemployment”).  EPA simultaneously regulated 
airborne emissions from pulp and paper mills under the Clean Air Act, but for ease 
of explication we limit our examination here to the Clean Water Act portion of the 
regulation. 
106 EPA, supra note 105, at 18,541–43. 
107 Id. at 18,542 (noting that, in mills used to provide data for Option A, “kappa 
factors for softwood furnish averaged .17 and all were less than .2”). 
108 Id. at 18,541–42. 
109 Id. at 18,542. 
110 EPA, Economic Analysis for the National Emission Standards for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants for Source Category: Pulp and Paper Production; Effluent 
Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance 
Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category—Phase 1, ch. 8, 8 (Oct. 27, 
1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/ost/pulppaper/jd/pulp.pdf, at 8-12 (Table 8-
6) (calculating the annual monetized benefits from reduction in cancer cases).  EPA 
also stated that the regulations would reduce risk of non-cancer illnesses but did not 
report monetary estimates because of inadequate data.  Id. at 8-14.  In addition, EPA 
estimated that the regulation would reduce deaths among Native Americans who are 
subsistence anglers.  Id. at 8-15 (Table 8-8).  However, it declined to include this 
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a single monetary value of life, instead announcing that each life saved 
was worth between $2.5 and $9 million.111  Second, reducing the 
quantity of dioxin released into fisheries would reduce the number of 
“fish advisories,” during which fishing must cease, and thus increase 
the number of days that fishing could take place.112  Third and finally, 
pulp and paper mills produce sludge, which must be disposed of.  
Reducing the amount of dioxin and furan in the sludge will allow the 
mills to dispose of the sludge via cheaper means.113
 At the same time, the regulation also imposed significant costs.  
Mills were forced to switch from chlorine-based chemicals to more 
expensive alternatives and treat their effluents before they were 
released into the waterways.
 
114
 
  Table 1 lists the annual costs and 
benefits, as calculated by EPA, of all three options the agency 
considered in its regulation of pulp and paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
benefit within the analysis because of uncertainty in the data.  Although this decision 
is probably indefensible, we adhere to it here in the interest of parallelism between 
our WBA and EPA’s CBA. 
111 Id. at 8-12 (Table 8-6). 
112 Id. at 8-23.  EPA also surmised that more anglers would elect to fish if toxic 
effluents were reduced, and it estimated the benefit of this increased fishing at $4.7 
to $15.5 million per year.  Again, however, because of uncertainties in the data EPA 
did not end up including these figures in its benefit estimate.  As with the benefits 
described above, we adhere to EPA’s decision without endorsing it.  Id. at 8-23, 8-
24, 8-26 (Table 8-12). 
113 Id. at 8-25. 
114 Id. at ch. 5. 
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Table 1: Annual Costs and Benefits, EPA Pulp and Paper Regulation 
(in millions of 1995 dollars)115
 
 
 Option A Option B Option TCF 
Total compliance 
costs -262 -324 -1081 
Benefits of 
cheaper sludge 
disposal 
8–16 8–16 8–16 
Benefits of 
eliminating 
fishing advisories  
2.1–19.4 2.1–19.4 2.1–19.4 
Monetized 
benefits of lives 
saved 
1.8–21.7 1.9–22.5 2.0–25.2 
Net benefits as 
calculated by the 
EPA 
-250.9 – 
-205.7 
-312.0 – 
-266.1 
-1,084.4 – 
-1,035.9 
Median net 
benefits -228.3 -289 -542.5 
 
As Table 1 makes clear, none of the options is cost-benefit justified 
according to standard CBA methodologies.  The EPA selected Option 
A, which appears to do the least harm, yet even under that option the 
costs exceed the benefits by more than $228 million per year.116
 In addition, and importantly for our analysis, EPA calculated 
that the regulation would lead to the loss of significant numbers of 
jobs.  The increased regulatory costs would increase pulp and paper 
prices, reducing consumer demand for pulp and paper products.  This 
reduction in demand would force mills to lay off workers.  As pulp 
and paper production declined, suppliers and affiliated industries 
would also suffer and be forced to lay off workers.  However, EPA did 
not include these lost jobs in its cost-benefit analysis.  This stemmed 
 
                                                          
115 This Table was assembled using data found at EPA, Economic Analysis, 
supra note 110, at 5-25 (Table 5-16), 5-28 (Table 5-18), 8-12 (Table 8-6), 8-23, 8-
25, 8-45, 8-23, 8-26 (Table 8-12). 
116 EPA calculated that Option A coupled with regulation under the Clean Air 
Act would result in net positive benefits, and so the agency’s eventual outcome is 
cost-benefit justified.  Id. at 8-27 (Table 8-13).  Of course, this begs the question as 
to why the EPA didn’t simply regulate only under the Clean Air Act if it produced 
substantial net benefits while regulation under the Clean Water Act produced 
substantial net costs. 
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from a belief, which continues to hold sway throughout the regulatory 
state, that workers will soon find alternative employment and the net 
costs of unemployment will be zero.117  This assumption is almost 
certainly false, and one of us has separately criticized the EPA and 
other regulatory agencies for refusing to include the costs of 
unemployment in their cost-benefit analyses.118
 We calculate here a revised cost-benefit analysis that includes 
unemployment costs.  (The welfare costs of unemployment will also 
figure prominently in the WBA that follows.)  For ease of explication, 
we list the compliance costs from Table 1 separately but combine the 
median figures for the three types of benefits (cheaper sludge disposal, 
elimination of fishing advisories, and lives saved) into one row, which 
we label “Median total benefits.” It is worth noting that the EPA did 
not estimate the total unemployment that would result under Option 
TCF, though it did estimate the number of jobs that would be 
eliminated under that Option due to pulp and paper mill closures 
alone.  Based upon those numbers, which we provide below, the job 
loss from Option TCF would have likely been quite substantial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
117 See Masur & Posner, Regulation & Unemployment, supra note 105. 
118 Id. 
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Table 2: Annual Costs and Benefits, EPA Pulp and Paper Regulation, 
Including Unemployment Costs (in millions of 1995 dollars)119
 
 
 Option A Option B Option TCF 
Compliance costs -262 -324 -1081 
Median total 
benefits 34.5 34.9 36.3 
Median net 
benefits excluding 
unemployment 
costs 
-228.3 -289 -542.5 
Jobs lost from 
plant closures 400 900 7100 
Total jobs lost 3094 5711 N/A 
Estimated annual 
unemployment 
costs120
-10.2 
 
-18.8 N/A 
Median net 
benefits including 
unemployment 
costs 
-238.5 -307.8 N/A 
 
 What should be immediately evident from Table 2 is that 
regulatory compliance costs—principally the costs of shifting to non-
chlorinated chemicals—dominate even this revised cost-benefit 
analysis.  Even for Option A, the least costly regulatory option, these 
compliance costs are nearly ten times greater than the total estimated 
benefits and more than twenty times greater than the costs related to 
unemployment.  This is not atypical for cost-benefit analysis.  
Industrial costs can be very steep and easily monetized, and so they 
can dwarf other inputs to the CBA.  In addition, a glance back at Table 
1 reveals that the monetized benefits of reducing deaths from cancer 
are quite modest when compared with the other benefits that the 
regulation will provide.  The monetized benefits from cheaper sludge 
removal and fewer fishing advisories, in combination, exceed the 
                                                          
119 This Table was assembled using data found at EPA, Economic Analysis, 
supra note 110, at 5-25 (Table 5-16), 5-28 (Table 5-18), 6-15 (Table 6-4),  6-34 
(Table 6-14), 6-44 (Table 6-19). 
120 This figure is based upon an estimated yearly cost of $3300 per unemployed 
worker.  See Masur & Posner, Regulation & Unemployment, at 105.  
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benefits from reducing the number of deaths from cancer.  These are 
both remarkable findings, and they shed light on the (possibly 
distorting) effects of monetizing costs and benefits.  What remains to 
be seen is whether they are indicative of the true welfare effects of the 
regulation.  That is a question we address in the following section. 
 
2. EPA’s Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Well-Being Analysis 
 
 In this section we re-engineer EPA’s cost-benefit analysis as a 
well-being analysis.  In order to do so, we convert the costs and 
benefits of the regulation into well-being units (WBUs).  Wherever 
possible, we make this conversion directly.  That is, we translate the 
benefits of reduced cancer deaths directly to WBUs, rather than 
adopting EPA’s pricing of those lives and then converting the dollars 
into WBUs.  Here, we will use mostly life satisfaction data, though we 
employ moment-by-moment measures of well-being when possible.  
Although life satisfaction is a less accurate measure of subjective well-
being than moment-by-moment measures such as ESM and DRM, 
psychologists and economists have thus far generated life satisfaction 
data in substantially greater quantities.121
 
  (This would surely change 
if WBA became a tool of actual policy analysis and was given even a 
fraction of the funding CBA now receives.)  All calculations are based 
on a well-being scale that runs from 0.0 to 10.0.  What follows is a 
summary of the conversion of each of the costs and benefits involved. 
Compliance Costs, Sludge Disposal, and Fewer Fishing Advisories 
 Compliance costs and the benefits of cheaper sludge disposal 
are both entirely monetary.  Ideally we would measure the welfare 
value of fewer fishing advisories by estimating the hedonic value of 
fishing and multiplying it by the additional hours that anglers will be 
able to spend engaged in that activity.  However, to our knowledge 
hedonic data on fishing does not yet exist.  Accordingly, we use the 
EPA’s monetary estimate of this benefit.  We sum these three 
quantities to determine the aggregate monetary cost of the regulation. 
 The next question is how to translate that monetary cost into 
WBUs.  These expenditures will have an effect on well-being only to 
the extent that they are paid for and felt by individuals.  Some of the 
benefits will accrue to the anglers who are able to fish with fewer 
interruptions.  Compliance costs and sludge-related benefits will be 
                                                          
121 See supra Part II.B. 
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borne by some combination of consumers of pulp and paper and 
shareholders in pulp and paper companies.  (The exact division 
depends on the extent to which pulp and paper firms are able to pass 
their costs along to consumers.) 
It is impossible to know precisely how many households will 
share these costs, though nearly every household consumes paper to 
some degree.  For purposes of this analysis we assume that the 
monetary costs and benefits will be equally borne by one million 
Americans.122  Each individual will bear several hundred dollars in net 
monetary costs, depending upon the regulatory option.  We also 
assume that each individual earns the median income, which in 1998 
was $38,885.123
 What effect will these monetary costs have on welfare?  
Studies have found that life satisfaction increases logarithmically with 
income.  We use the results of one of the largest and most recent of 
these studies, which found that an approximately three-fold increase  
in income was associated with a .11 increase in WBUs.
 
124  (Similarly, 
a two-thirds decrease was associated with a .11 decrease in WBUs.125
 
)  
That is, an individual whose income increased from $100,000 per year 
to $272,000 per year would gain .11 WBUs per year.  If that same 
individual’s income decreased from $100,000 to $36,700 would lose 
.11 WBUs.  The total gain or loss is given by the following formula: 
                                                          
122 Because the total dollar cost is a constant number, our analysis is largely 
unaffected by whether that total cost is spread across virtually everyone who 
consumes paper products (say, 200 million Americans) or a much smaller subset 
(say, 1 million).  The only difference is that if the total is borne by a smaller subset 
rather than spread across everyone, then each person affected must pay a higher 
amount.  That results in a larger effect of cost on well-being, since money affects 
welfare in a logarithmic rather than linear fashion.  We anticipate that our analysis 
may be criticized for placing too little weight on the value of money, so we choose 
the number “one million” (as opposed to, say, 200 million or everyone) purely to 
make the most conservative possible assumption.  That is, we accentuate the welfare 
effects of lost income, and it still has only a small one.  Our calculation on this point 
should thus be considered an upper bound on the welfare effect of monetary costs. 
123 U.S. Census Bureau, Money Income in the United States (1998), at v, 
available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/p60-206.pdf. 
124 Nattavudh Powdthavee & Bernard van den Berg, Putting Different Price 
Tags on the Same Health Condition: Re-evaluating the Well-being Valuation 
Approach (unpublished manuscript 2011), at 32 (Table 3). 
125 Id. 
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(1) Welfare loss due to income decline = .11 WBU × ( ln (new 
income) – ln (old income) ) 
 
We apply this formula to the income loss caused by the net costs of 
EPA’s regulation in Table 3, below. 
 
Cancer Cases Avoided 
 EPA provides a range of estimates for the number of cases of 
cancer that will be avoided under each regulatory option.  In the 
interest of simplicity, we base our calculations on the median number.  
There are limited available data on the welfare loss that an individual 
experiences when she is sick with cancer, but one study calculated the 
welfare loss from “stomach/liver/kidneys or digestive problems,” 
which we believe is the closest analog.126  That welfare loss is .238 
WBUs per year while the person is sick.127  We assume that the typical 
individual who dies from cancer caused by dioxin and furan effluents 
is sick with cancer for two years and then dies thirty years before she 
normally would.128  This is obviously a rough assumption, but it is no 
more rough than EPA’s assumption that all lives are equivalently 
valuable and have a median value of $5.75 million.129  The average 
American has a life satisfaction of 7.4 (again, on a scale of 0.0 to 
10.0).130
 
  When an individual dies, she loses all of the welfare that she 
might otherwise have experienced throughout the remaining years of 
her life.  Thus, we calculate the welfare benefit from avoiding one 
fatal case of cancer by the following equation: 
(2) Welfare benefit from avoided fatal cancer = 2 × (.238 WBU) + 
30 × 7.4 WBU = 222.48 WBUs 
 
                                                          
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 To arrive at this number, we begin by noting that the average American 
lifespan is 78 years.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: 2012, at 77.  If anglers were evenly distributed across age categories, then 
the average angler would be 39 years old, meaning that saving such a person from 
death would save them nearly 40 years of life.  In recognition that our well-being 
numbers may be criticized for valuing life too much more heavily than does CBA, 
we “round down” to make a very conservative estimate of 30 years. 
129 See supra Parts III.A.1, IV.C. 
130 Ed Diener & Carol Diener, Most People Are Happy, 7 PSYCH. SCI. 181 
(1996). 
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Unemployment 
Unemployment is one condition about which there exists 
substantial hedonic data, both moment-by-moment (DRM) and life 
satisfaction.  Interestingly, however, the life satisfaction and moment-
by-moment data differ significantly.  Life satisfaction studies conclude 
that unemployment has a significant, long-term effect on well-
being.131  Unemployed individuals suffer a loss of 0.83 WBUs per 
year during the time that they remain unemployed.132  Even after 
finding new employment, these same individuals lose 0.34 WBUs per 
year during the rest of their working lives.133  On the other hand, a 
study of moment-by-moment affect found that the unemployed 
actually had greater well-being than people who held jobs.134  Though 
this result may seem suspect, it was supported by very particularized 
findings.  The unemployed enjoyed any given activity less than 
similarly situated employed individuals.  That is, they enjoyed 
themselves less while socializing, or playing a sport, or reading, or 
even doing housework.135  However, they were able to spend much 
more time in comparatively enjoyable pursuits, such as socializing or 
playing a sport, because they did not have to work.136  The employed 
naturally spent much of their days at work, which is a relatively 
unpleasant activity for most people, according to the hedonic data.137  
The ability to spend more time engaged in pleasurable activities more 
than balanced out the decreased enjoyment of each individual activity.  
In the aggregate, being unemployed causes an individual to gain 0.084 
WBUs.138
 We apply a Condorcetian approach and employ the average of 
the two findings here.
 
139
                                                          
131 Richard E. Lucas, Adaptation and the Set-Point Model of Subjective Well-
Being: Does Happiness Change After Major Life Events?, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS 
IN PSYCH. SCI. 75 (2007); Lucas et al., supra note 
  Accordingly, we estimate that the 
64.   
132 See Lucas et al., supra note 64. 
133 Id. 
134 Andreas Knabe et al., Dissatisfied with Life but Having a Good Day: Time-
Use and Well-being of the Unemployed, 120 ECON. J. 867, 878 (2010). 
135 Id. at 876. 
136 Id. 
137 E.g., id. 
138 Id. at 878.  The number reported in the study is actually 0.168, but it was 
based on a scale that ran from -10.0 to 10.0.  We normalize to our 0.0 to 10.0 scale. 
139 See generally Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2009) (cataloguing the benefits and risks associated with 
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unemployed lose 0.373 WBUs per year (the average of -0.83 and 
0.084) during the time they are unemployed, and they lose 0.17 WBUs 
per year (the average of -0.34 and 0) during the rest of their working 
years after becoming reemployed.  We assume that the average person 
who becomes unemployed as a result of this regulation is out of work 
for six months (and thus loses 0.373 × .5 WBUs), and that after 
finding a new job she works for 15 additional years.  Data on these 
quantities is unavailable, though it could easily be collected if an 
agency became interested in doing so. 
 EPA’s CBA presents only yearly costs and benefits, not total 
costs and benefits.  The agency annualized all costs over a 30-year 
period.140
 
  However, the agency calculated total (as opposed to yearly) 
unemployment.  Accordingly, we divide the hedonic costs of being 
unemployed by 30 in order to obtain the yearly costs, similarly 
annualized over a 30-year period.  The hedonic effect of the 
unemployment caused by the EPA’s pulp and paper regulation is given 
by the following equation: 
(3) Welfare cost of unemployment = ((-0.373 × .5) + (-0.17 × 
15))/30 = -0.0912 WBUs 
 
 We are now prepared to aggregate the welfare effects of the 
various costs and benefits.  Table 3 presents the WBA of EPA’s 
regulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
decision mechanisms that incorporate multiple points of view and sources of 
information). 
140 EPA, Economic Analysis, supra note 110, at 4-23. 
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Table 3: Well-Being Analysis of EPA’s Pulp and Paper Regulation141
 
 
 Option A Option B Option TCF 
Net monetary 
costs (millions of 
1995 $) 
-239.25 -301.25 -1058.25 
Welfare effects of 
net monetary 
costs (WBUs) 
-0.00068 -0.00086 -0.00304 
Median cases of 
cancer avoided 1.57 1.62 1.79 
Welfare effects of 
avoided cancer 
cases (WBUs) 
349.29 360.42 398.24 
Total jobs lost 3094 5711 N/A 
Welfare effects of 
unemployment 
(WBUs) 
-282.22 -520.94 N/A 
Total welfare 
effect (WBUs) 67.07 -160.52 N/A 
 
 This WBA diverges from EPA’s CBA in two particularly 
notable respects.  First, Option A now appears welfare-justified: it will 
increase overall well-being in the net.  Option B is still not welfare-
justified, but it appears less egregiously harmful than it did through the 
lens of cost-benefit analysis.  EPA may well have been correct to 
choose Option A (rather than not regulating at all), contrary to what 
CBA would indicate.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, the 
monetary costs of the regulation, which dominated the CBA, are 
nearly irrelevant here.  Instead, the benefits of saving lives and the 
costs of unemployment produce the dominant welfare effects.  This 
may appear surprising to scholars steeped in cost-benefit analysis, but 
it is entirely consistent with reams of evidence demonstrating that 
                                                          
141 This Table was assembled using data found at EPA, National Emissions 
Standards, supra note 105, at 18588 & 18591, and EPA, Economic Analysis, supra 
note 110, at 6-34 (Table 6-14) and 8-45. 
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changes in wealth and income have extremely small impact on 
individual well-being.142
 This is not to say that policymakers should begin ignoring the 
effects of their regulations on wealth.  As we explain below, 
regulations that increase welfare at the expense of vast amounts of 
wealth might eventually become self-defeating and eliminate future 
opportunities for welfare gains.
 
143
 Of course, we present here only a back-of-the-envelope sketch 
of a WBA.  Our conclusion that EPA’s pulp and paper regulation was 
welfare-enhancing is necessarily tentative and dependent upon our 
assumptions, which may be incorrect.  But this exercise should 
demonstrate the feasibility of WBA as a workable decision tool.  It is 
possible to conduct a full-scale WBA of a major regulation using only 
the scattered data currently available.  With sustained effort and 
attention on the part of the regulatory state, WBA could revolutionize 
the accuracy with which prospective laws are evaluated. 
  This is why we would not rule out 
preserving CBA as a complement to WBA.  But the WBA we perform 
here indicates the distortions introduced by CBA’s focus on wealth 
and monetization.  Regulations that do not appear cost-benefit justified 
might in fact be found to greatly enhance welfare once that welfare is 
measured more directly. 
 
III.  WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND WELL-BEING 
 
 In order to translate costs and benefits into dollars, cost-benefit 
analysis relies upon measures of how much individuals are willing to 
pay to acquire benefits or avoid harms.144  These so-called 
“willingness-to-pay” (“WTP”) measures are determined in two types 
of ways.  In some cases, economists attempt to measure individual 
valuations through studies of “revealed preferences”—studies that 
demonstrate how much individuals are implicitly willing to pay to gain 
some benefit or willing to accept to bear some harm.145
                                                          
142 For a review of the extensive literature, see Ed Diener and Robert Biswas- 
Diener, Will Money Increase Subjective Well-being? A Literature Review and Guide 
to Needed Research, 57 SOC. INDICATORS. RES. 119 (2002). 
  For instance, 
143 See infra Part III.A.1. 
144 Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
931, 945 (2000) (“In mainstream cost-benefit analysis, the primary work of valuation 
is done by the use of willingness to pay.”). 
145 Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 76 (1995) (“[P]eople reveal the values they attach to various 
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some studies center on the wage premium for workers who take 
dangerous jobs: they examine how much more a firm must pay a 
worker to accept a job that carries some type of risk, thus revealing the 
price a worker would put on avoiding that risk.146  Sometimes, 
however, cost-benefit analysis must place prices on costs or benefits 
that are not traded in a robust marketplace, such as clean air.147  In 
these cases, where revealed preferences are unavailable, economists 
rely upon surveys that ask respondents hypothetically how much they 
would be willing to pay to procure a particular benefit or eliminate a 
particular harm.  These surveys are known as “stated preference” (in 
contrast to revealed preference) or “contingent valuation” studies.148
 Both revealed preference studies and contingent valuation 
studies are fraught with difficulties and significant sources of error.  
These difficulties have led to unresolvable theoretical and 
methodological disputes among CBA’s proponents, and they are 
widely cited as undermining the validity and reliability of cost-benefit 
analysis.  Nevertheless, cost-benefit analysis continues to rely upon 
them because it is believed that there is no alternative.  Yet well-being 
analysis, if conducted properly, could in fact ameliorate or even 
eliminate many of the difficulties endemic to willingness-to-pay 
measures.  The sections that follow describe some of the most 
important sources of error involved in the measurement of 
willingness-to-pay and explain how well-being analysis would 
constitute an improvement over the flawed status quo. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
goods through their actual behavior in market or market-like settings. If we attend to 
the choices people actually make, we will be able to infer from them the valuations 
assigned to various goods.”). 
146 See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 46-47 (1998). 
147 Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1557 (2002) (“Since 
there are no natural prices for a healthy environment, cost-benefit analysis requires 
the creation of artificial ones.”); Miriam Montesinos, Comment, It May be Silly, but 
It’s an Answer: The Need to Accept Contingent Valuation Methodology in Natural 
Resource Damage Assessments, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 48, 49-50 (1999) (“The problem 
with placing values on natural resources is that natural resources are not 
commodities and therefore do not have market prices.”). 
148 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Stated Willingness to Pay for Public 
Goods: A Psychological Perspective, 4 PSYCHOL. SCI. 310 (1993); Richard H. Pildes 
& Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 80 
(1995) (“Rather than looking at actual choices, these methods ask people 
hypothetical questions about how much they would be willing to pay to avoid certain 
harms or conditions.”). 
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A. Revealed Preferences 
 
CBA’s preferred method for quantifying costs and benefits is 
to examine what actual consumers of a good (such as workplace safety 
or clean air) were willing to pay to acquire that good.149  These 
“revealed preference” studies are particularly common in the context 
of workplace hazards: there are many studies of the wage premiums 
paid to workers who take dangerous jobs.150  Indeed, CBA prices lives 
primarily by using wage premiums—the amount by which the wages 
of dangerous jobs exceed those of jobs that are safe but otherwise 
comparable.151
The value of a life is central to CBA in part because so many 
regulations involve trading off some good (such as consumer costs) 
against a risk of death from injury or disease.  Accordingly, accurate 
calculations of the value of life are absolutely essential to CBA.  In 
addition, revealed preference studies could conceivably be used to 
price other goods, such as clean air or a new road or park, by looking 
at those goods’ effect on housing prices. 
  If, for example, a job with an annual death risk of 1 in 
10,000 paid $100 more per year than a comparable job with no risk, 
that would imply that workers had priced their lives at $1 million 
(10,000 x $100).  According to this approach, high wage premiums 
reveal that people value their lives a lot, because they need to be paid a 
lot in order to incur the risk of death.  Low wage premiums mean the 
opposite. 
Yet these revealed preference studies are fraught with potential 
sources of error.  Those error sources fall loosely into three categories: 
informational and computational problems, wealth effects, and 
affective forecasting difficulties.  The first two could conceivably be 
overcome at herculean effort and expense; the third is likely 
insuperable.  WBA, by contrast, offers an elegant solution to many of 
the most difficult of these problems.  
 
                                                          
149 E.g., Edna T. Loehman et. al., Willingness to Pay for Gains and Losses in 
Visibility and Health, 70 LAND ECON. 476 (1994) (examining how much people 
would pay for improved air quality). 
150 See VISCUSI, supra note 146 at 312–13 (stating that the literature on wage-
risk tradeoffs has become the basis for government policy). 
151 E.g., W. Kip Viscusi, How to Value A Life, 32 J. ECON. & FIN. 311, 312–13 
(2008); see also, e.g., ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER 
RULE: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 5-28 (2000). 
 
 
 
 
 WELL-BEING ANALYSIS VS. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 39 
1. Informational and Computational Problems 
 
Economists favor revealed preference studies because they 
focus on individuals’ actual economic decisions.  However, that means 
that these studies must rely on individuals to make accurate and 
informed decisions regarding their own welfare.  Errors in individual 
decision-making will lead to errors in the measurement of costs and 
benefits.  The problems with this approach are particularly manifest in 
the context of wage premium studies, and they are manifold. 
First, wage premium studies assume that people are able to 
assimilate a 1-in-10,000 risk of death so as to decide whether they 
prefer avoiding that risk or earning extra money.  But empirical 
evidence contradicts that assumption.152  In study after study,153 
“survey respondents displayed an utter inability to modulate their 
willingness to pay for increases in safety according to how much those 
safety increases actually would diminish the probability of harm.”154  
People’s minds are not designed to differentiate between exceedingly 
small risks and infinitesimally small risks, and when asked to do so 
rationally, they frequently fail.155
Second, most wage-premium studies are based on the 
assumption that workers know the actual mortality risk (1 in 10,000, 
  As a result, small differences in pay 
between certain risky jobs and certain safe jobs cannot be attributed to 
a rational demand by workers to be compensated appropriately for the 
risk. 
                                                          
152 Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1331-37 
(2007). 
153 M.W. Jones-Lee et al., Valuing the Prevention of Non-Fatal Road Injuries: 
Contingent Valuation vs. Standard Gambles, 47 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 676, 688 
(1995); C.-T. Jordan Lin & J. Walter Milon, Contingent Valuation of Health Risk 
Reductions for Shellfish Products, in VALUING FOOD SAFETY AND NUTRITION 83–
114 (J.A. Caswell ed., 1995); Young Sook Eom, Pesticide Residue Risk and Food 
Safety Valuation: A Random Utility Approach, 76 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 760, 769 
(1994); V. Kerry Smith & William H. Desvousges, An Empirical Analysis of the 
Economic Value of Risk Changes, 95 J. POL. ECON. 89, 100 tbl.2 (1987); M.W. 
Jones-Lee et al., The Value of Safety: Results of a National Sample Survey, 95 ECON. 
J. 49, 65–66 (1985). 
154 Masur, supra note 152, at 1335. 
155 Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 
YALE L.J. 61, 73-74 (2002) (“For most of us, most of the time, the relevant 
differences—between, say, 1/100,000 and 1/1,000,000—are not pertinent to our 
decisions, and by experience we are not well equipped to take those differences into 
account.”). 
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for example) of their job.156
Third, even if people could assimilate these low-probability 
numbers and knew the actual mortality risk of their jobs, they might 
act on such knowledge in ways other than demanding slightly more 
money for those jobs.  For example, they might choose to incur the 
cost of being more careful on the job rather than incur the cost of 
taking a safer job that they enjoy less.  Such a choice would fulfill 
CBA’s dubious assumption of economic rationality while still 
rendering grossly inaccurate the life-value numbers arising from CBA. 
  There is no reason to believe that this is 
so, and if it is not, then the studies’ validity breaks down: one cannot 
rationally demand a specific amount of extra money in return for a 
specific amount of risk if one does not know what the amount of risk 
is. 
Fourth, it may be that 1-in-10,000 risks of death are simply too 
fine-grained for regression analysis to detect.  There are countless 
differences between one job and another.  Even a careful CBA study 
that identifies a few dozen of those differences has necessarily left out 
scores of smaller ones.  The small risk to life, if it is traded off at all by 
workers, could be traded off against these smaller differences rather 
than the larger ones that are visible to econometricians.  Indeed, 
CBA’s wage premiums seem to fluctuate for reasons independent of 
risk to life.  For example, when unions in the trucking industry lost 
some of their capacity to influence management, drivers’ wages failed 
to keep pace with those of comparable jobs in other industries.157  
Developments like that one, which had nothing to do with workers’ 
tolerance for risk, resulted in CBA’s use of lower wage-premium 
numbers (and thus lower values for life).158
                                                          
156 Maureen Cropper, James K. Hammitt, and Lisa A. Robinson, Valuing 
Mortality Risk Reductions: Progress and Challenges, 3 ANN. REV. RESOUR. ECON. 
313, 317 (2012). 
  In theory, one might say 
that a perfect CBA would isolate the value of risk by accounting for 
union power and everything else like it that can affect wages.  But this 
has not happened in practice, and it might be impossible even in 
theory.  No two jobs are truly equivalent in every relevant feature 
except their risk to life.  And even if there were two such jobs, they 
could not remain equivalent over time, because their wages would be 
157 MICHAEL H. BELZER, SWEATSHOPS ON WHEELS: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN 
TRUCKING DEREGULATION 21-22 (2000); ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, 
at 87. 
158 See, e.g., Janusz R. Mrozek & Laura O. Taylor, What Determines the Value 
of Life? A Meta-Analysis, 21 J. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 253, 266-70 (2002). 
 
 
 
 
 WELL-BEING ANALYSIS VS. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 41 
affected in different ways by economic developments independent of 
risk. 
In light of these problems, it should not be surprising that wage 
premium studies have produced widely variant values of life.  Studies 
using similar methodologies have set the value of a statistical life as 
low as $100,000 and as high as $76,000,000.159
WBA, by contrast, sidesteps nearly all of these problems.  
WBA does not require that individuals understand the risk of death in 
the workplace, nor must they be able to accurately grasp what it means 
to face a 1/100,000 risk.  Under WBA, an individual is only required 
to report her current state of well-being accurately, a far simpler 
cognitive task.  There is no need to assume that individuals make 
perfectly rational choices under conditions of perfect information.  The 
value of an individual life can be measured simply by aggregating the 
positive and negative moments in that life, as reported by the 
individual. 
  Such large variation 
in the results of the studies casts doubt on their reliability and validity 
and suggests that random noise or unmeasured variables, rather than 
rational risk-tradeoffs, account for the numbers. 
WBA also eliminates some of the need to perform complicated 
regression analysis in order to compare similarly situated jobs or 
marketplace goods.  Here, WBA’s advantage lies in the ability to take 
advantage of longitudinal studies.  Suppose that an agency is 
attempting to value the cost of a case of emphysema (in terms of pain, 
suffering, and diminution in the quality of life) in order to analyze a 
regulation that would protect workers from contracting emphysema in 
the workplace.  CBA would examine the wages paid to workers in 
industries where emphysema is a workplace hazard, and then using 
regression analysis would attempt to isolate the wage premium that is 
attributable directly to the risk of emphysema.  This is an extremely 
difficult endeavor, as we explained above.  WBA, on the other hand, 
would simply look at the well-being of a given individual before and 
after she contracted emphysema.  The post-emphysema loss in well-
                                                          
159 Janusz R. Mrozek and Laura O. Taylor, What Determines the Value of Life? 
A Meta-Analysis, 21 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 253, 254 (2002); EPA, Valuing 
Mortality Risk Reductions for Environmental Policy: A White Paper (Dec. 10, 
2010), at 85-88.  Another indication of the spread of possible results from such 
studies is a meta-analysis that the EPA recently performed of thirty-seven hedonic 
wage studies.  The standard deviation of the values of life among those thirty-seven 
studies was $14.1 million, or approximately twice the value that EPA currently 
places on a statistical life.  Id. at 85-88 (standard deviation calculated by author).  
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being represents the hedonic cost of the disease, a cost which the 
agency can then weigh against other hedonic costs and benefits.  
Economists have already made use of large sets of social survey data 
to conduct exactly these types of studies.160
 We hasten to add that this approach will not eliminate the need 
for regression analysis entirely.  Other circumstances in the 
individual’s life may have changed during the same time period.  For 
instance,  her disease may have forced her to take a different job, 
reducing her wages.  WBA will have to account for these changes as 
well, using regression analysis, but the problem will be much simpler.  
Because the study will involve the same individuals at multiple 
different times, it will not be necessary to control for nearly so many 
variables.  That CBA cannot similarly utilize longitudinal studies, and 
must instead rely on how much money a (potentially uninformed) 
individual would pay or accept at a given instant, is just one of its 
methodological shortcomings.  
 
 
2. Wealth Effects 
 
 It has long been understood that the value an individual places 
on a risk or a benefit will necessarily be affected by that individual’s 
wealth.161
                                                          
160 See Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A 
Longitudinal Study of Disability With Implications For Economists and Judges, 92 J. 
Pub. Econ 1061 (2008) (using a longitudinal study to determine the hedonic cost of 
disability). 
  A millionaire might think nothing of paying $10,000 to 
breathe slightly cleaner air, but someone who must support a family on 
$25,000 per year will be much more hesitant to make the same 
tradeoff.  Similarly, wealthy people rarely take high-risk jobs because 
the wage premium is worth less to them and is insufficient to 
compensate them for the risk.  The reason is not that the benefit or risk 
161 W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical 
View of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 36-
43 (2003) (finding an income elasticity between 0.5 and 0.6, such that a 10% rise in 
income would increase WTP by 5-6%); see also W. Kip Viscusi, The Heterogeneity 
of the Value of Statistical Life: Introduction and Overview, 40 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 1 (2010) (summarizing more recent research finding that WTP values 
are more sensitive to income than previously thought); Thomas Kniesner, W. Kip 
Viscusi & James P. Ziliak, Policy Relevant Heterogeneity in the Value of Statistical 
Life: New Evidence from Panel Data Quantile Regressions, 40 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 14 (2010) (finding an income elasticity approaching or exceeding 1.0, 
such that a 10% rise in income would increase WTP by 10%+). 
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involved is greater for the wealthier person (though there may be 
slight differences).  Rather, wealth effects are driven by the fact that 
the money is worth less to the wealthy person.162
 
  Because cost-benefit 
analysis involves translating harms and benefits into dollars, these 
“wealth effects” will affect cost-benefit calculations. 
a) Wage Premiums and Other Revealed 
Preferences 
 
Wealth effects play a large and undeniable role in wage 
premium studies, yet CBA ignores those effects.  By focusing only on 
the wage premium of people in risky jobs, CBA impermissibly washes 
out the different values that would come from differently situated 
people.  More fundamentally, the fact that rich people and poor people 
(who presumably care equally, or at least comparably, about staying 
alive) would be willing to pay vastly different amounts to avoid a 1-in-
10,000 risk of death illustrates the inadequacy of this metric for 
valuing lives.  WBA circumvents these issues entirely by valuing lives 
based individuals’ own assessments of their well-being. 
Yet the problem of wealth effects for revealed preference 
studies and CBA is even more general.  In order to demonstrate this, 
let us abstract away from wage studies to more general methods for 
utilizing revealed preferences.  In theory, an agency employing CBA 
could use housing prices or other data that reflect the benefits and 
costs of living under various conditions in order to put a value on 
those conditions.163
                                                          
162 The reason is the declining marginal value of money.  See, e.g., Andrew P. 
Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, Borders and the Environment, 39 ENVTL. L. 141, 155 
n.64 (2009) (“Of course, richer people lose more money when they miss a day of 
work due to illness than do poor people, but the declining marginal value of money 
means that what they lose may not be as valuable as the smaller in magnitude losses 
incurred by the poorer people.”); Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative Nature of 
Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1599 n.88 (2009) (“Even rights denominated in 
dollars cannot meaningfully be compared to each other without considering how 
people value those dollars. Due to the declining marginal value of money, most 
people value the liberty to spend $100,000 less than 100 times the amount that they 
value the liberty to spend $1000.”). 
  Imagine, for instance, that an agency is 
attempting to put a dollar figure on the cost of having a nearby factory 
that emits noxious fumes.  The agency could compare housing prices 
163 Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1273, 
1276-80 (2008) (describing such a methodology and using it to value certain legal 
changes). 
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in locations with clean air and locations with noxious fumes and use 
multivariate regression to isolate the effect of the noxious fumes on 
those prices.  This represents a particularly advanced method for 
revealing preferences in that the method can encompass circumstances 
in which individuals are not directly exchanging money for a good. 
 Now imagine a government project that will create noxious 
fumes, resulting in a uniform decrease in well-being of everyone 
within range of those fumes, but will have overall positive effects 
more generally.  (A waste storage facility might fit this description.)  
This project can be located in a rich area with 500 very wealthy people 
or a poor area with 1000 people.  Imagine that the agency is able to 
determine that the 500 wealthy people would be willing to pay 
$50,000 each to avoid having the waste storage facility placed in their 
neighborhood, while the poorer people would be willing to pay 
$10,000 each. 
 If the agency that is deciding where to site the project can tax 
and transfer as part of the project, the solution—purely from the 
perspective of welfare economics—is clear.  The government should 
locate the project in the poor area, and make a compensating transfer 
from the wealthy to the poor.  The wealthy people would prefer to pay, 
say, $25,000 per person to avoid having the project located in their 
neighborhood, and that would be enough money to compensate the 
poorer people such that they would prefer to accept the money and the 
facility over receiving neither.  If such a transfer were also to make the 
poorer people happier on balance, then both CBA and WBA would 
recommend that the agency pursue that course. 
 Suppose, however, that the agency cannot implement the 
transfer and this first-best solution is unavailable.  If the agency is 
using CBA based upon actual willingness-to-pay statistics from the 
two areas, it could find that the 500 wealthy people are willing to pay 
more to avoid the noxious fumes (500 x $50,000 = $25 million) than 
the 1000 poor people (1000 x $10,000 = $10 million), purely because 
of wealth effects.  It thus might end up locating the project in the poor 
area rather than the wealthy area.  But doing so will actually lead to a 
greater reduction in welfare than locating the project in the wealthy 
area, simply because there are more people who will be affected by the 
project in the poorer neighborhood. 
 By contrast, a decision-maker employing WBA would pick up 
on the actual welfare effects of these two options and realize that the 
welfare loss will be greater if the project is located in the poor area 
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than if it is located in the wealthy area, because it will affect twice the 
number of people in the poor area.  It will site the project in the 
wealthier area.  An agency using WBA will thus arrive at the second-
best solution; an agency employing CBA will select only the third-best 
option.164
 This phenomenon is much more general.  Any time a 
government agency must decide between two projects—or two 
locations for the same project—one of which will affect wealthy 
people and the other of which will affect poor people, it risks being led 
astray by wealth effects.  It may be led to believe that the “wealthy” 
project will have a greater effect on welfare than the “poor” project, 
simply because of the impact of wealth on willingness to pay.  When 
the agency cannot tax and transfer—and nearly all agencies lack that 
authority—it will err and select the wrong project.  WBA, on the other 
hand, would not be confused by wealth effects.  WBA does not require 
that costs and benefits be translated into dollars, and so the wealth of 
the affected population cannot confound the analysis. 
 
 
 b) Wealth and Welfare 
 
WBA also has a tremendous advantage over CBA when 
evaluating projects that increase wealth directly: it will be able to 
measure the actual welfare effects of those changes in wealth.  This 
may seem counter-intuitive; after all, CBA is based upon counting and 
comparing different quantities of money.  But the gap between money 
and well-being that only WBA recognizes speaks to one of the 
fundamental drawbacks of CBA and its limitations as a decision tool.  
This issue is not directly related to revealed preference studies or even 
willingness-to-pay more generally, but it is central enough to be worth 
noting here. 
Consider a project that increases the income of a group of 
individuals $1000 per person.165
                                                          
164 In addition, if the agency chose the second-best solution and located the 
project in the wealthy area, residents of that neighborhood could conceivably bargain 
with residents of the poorer neighborhood to have the project moved in exchange for 
a side payment.  This bargain is of course unlikely; transaction costs or legal barriers 
might prevent it.  But it is at least possible.  No such Coasean bargain is possible if 
the project is located in the poor neighborhood because the poorer people do not 
have the funds to pay off the wealthier people. 
  Imagine that this project can be 
165 A tax credit is the most obvious example of such a project, but there are 
many others that would fit this description.  For instance, substantial spending on 
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directed to benefit either wealthy or poorer individuals.  The project 
will obviously improve welfare to a much greater degree if it is 
directed to benefit the poorer population, again because of the 
declining marginal value of money—$1000 means more to someone 
making $30,000 than to someone making $300,000.166
CBA, on the other hand, will rate the project identically 
irrespective of whether it is directed to benefit poorer or wealthier 
individuals.  In a CBA, money is money: $1000 in the hands of a rich 
person has the same value as $1000 in the hands of a poor person.  
CBA will thus underrate the welfare benefits of projects that increase 
the wealth of poorer individuals and overrate the welfare benefits of 
projects that increase the wealth of richer individuals.  Just as wealth 
effects can cause CBA to misestimate the welfare effects of non-
monetary benefits, they can similarly cause CBA to misestimate the 
welfare effects of monetary benefits.  This bespeaks the limitations of 
CBA as a welfarist decision procedure.
  WBA will 
register and account for this fact because it tracks self-reports of actual 
well-being.  The project that benefits the poor community will “score 
higher” in a properly conducted WBA. 
167
The point can be made even more starkly by imagining a 
project that takes $1000 from a poor person but provides $1100 to a 
wealthy person.  It will pass a cost-benefit test simply because $1100 
is greater than $1000.  Yet such a project would almost certainly be 
welfare-diminishing; $1000 is likely worth far more to a poor person 
than $1100 is to a wealthy person.  WBA would reject it, and rightly 
so, on precisely those grounds.  By eliminating the need to translate 
welfare into dollars and instead measuring welfare more generally, 
WBA avoids the distortions that wealth effects can generate.
  Where wealth and welfare 
do not align, CBA will lead to erroneous results. 
168
                                                                                                                                         
transportation infrastructure could lower the costs of an individual’s yearly commute 
to work by hundreds or even thousands of dollars.  An agency might be faced with a 
decision whether to invest transportation dollars in building a) a new subway line 
from downtown Chicago to the South Side of the city, in order to serve the lower-
income people who live in that neighborhood; or b) a new high-speed rail line from 
Midtown Manhattan to Greenwich, Connecticut in order to serve the hedge fund 
managers who live in one location and work in the other. 
  
166 See supra note 162 and sources cited therein. 
167 See Adler & Posner, supra note 10, at 194. 
168 This is related to a point often made by both proponents and critics of CBA, 
namely that CBA aims to maximize efficiency while ignoring distributional 
considerations.  See, e.g., Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the 
Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1415 (2005); 
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Despite the obvious force of this criticism, defenders of CBA 
have a rejoinder.  They argue that making decisions based upon CBA 
will lead to outcomes that are Kaldor-Hicks efficient.169  A Kaldor-
Hicks efficient outcome is one in which the parties that benefit from a 
project “could fully compensate those who stand to lose from it and 
still be better off.”170   Or, put another way, a project is Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient if it were possible to make a transfer of wealth that would 
leave all parties better off than before the project was implemented.171
Yet the strength of this rejoinder rests upon an extremely 
tenuous assumption: that the transfer will actually occur.  Absent such 
a transfer, a project that is Kaldor-Hicks efficient could well lead to a 
decrease in welfare, as we have shown.  This is why even some of 
CBA’s most eloquent defenders have acknowledged that “Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency has zero moral relevance.”
  
For instance, in the example above, the government could implement 
the project, and then, using the tax system, transfer $1050 from the 
rich individual to the poorer individual, leaving each better off by $50 
than before the project was begun. 
172
                                                                                                                                         
Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal 
Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550-51 (1939); Adler & Posner, supra note 
  It is of course difficult 
to speculate as to whether these welfare-enhancing compensating 
transfers will occur in a meaningful fraction of cases, and little reliable 
10, at 186 (“The purpose of CBA, as typically understood, is to separate out the 
distributional issue and isolate the efficiency issue, so that the agency will evaluate 
projects solely on the basis of their efficiency.”).  There is an important ambiguity 
within this statement that frequently leads to confusion.  Some scholars imply that 
CBA focuses purely on maximizing overall utility—which, for our purposes, is 
equivalent to welfare—without regard to which individuals are benefitting from 
increased utility.  See, e.g., Sinden, supra, at 1415 (“Note that welfare economics 
single-mindedly pursues the goal of maximizing overall social utility and takes no 
position as to the distribution of utility or wealth.”).  This gives CBA too much 
credit, for as we have shown there can be projects that pass a cost-benefit test but 
actually decrease welfare.  Other scholars, particularly economists who favor CBA, 
understand correctly that it is directed to maximizing wealth (or, equivalently, 
efficiency).  See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 10, at 186.  This is accurate, but as 
we have said it exposes the limitations of CBA as a welfarist decision procedure. 
169 See, e.g., ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: 
CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 53 (1996); E.J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 390 
(1976). 
170 Sinden, supra note 168, at 1415. 
171 See, e.g., BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 169, at 53. 
172 Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 37 J. Legal Stud. S253, S65 (2008). 
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data exists.  But there is every reason to believe that they will be rare, 
not least of all because they involve redistributions from politically 
powerful groups and individuals (the wealthy) to groups and 
individuals with much less political power (the poor).173
CBA’s defenders might offer one final related argument.  
While CBA will occasionally support projects that diminish welfare, 
WBA will equally favor projects that diminish wealth.  For instance, a 
project that causes a wealthy individual to lose $1100 and a poor 
individual to gain $1000 would pass a WBA test (because it would 
increase welfare), just as it would fail a CBA test.  Over time, 
defenders of CBA might say, single-minded use of CBA would lead to 
a diminution in national (or worldwide) wealth, with long-term 
negative consequences.
  
174  For instance, a welfare-enhancing but 
wealth-diminishing project might be so expensive that the government 
would later be unable to implement an additional (superior) welfare-
enhancing project, leading to the loss of future welfare gains.175
This argument is correct so far as it goes, though it hardly 
offers a reason to prefer CBA to WBA.  A methodology that can lead 
directly to welfare-diminishing results (CBA) is not uniformly 
preferable to one that might conceivably lead indirectly to welfare-
diminishing results at some point in the indefinite future (WBA).  
Nevertheless, it is for this reason that we do not advocate entirely 
discarding CBA in favor of WBA.  Both methodologies provide useful 
information, and agencies should employ both of them.  A project that 
barely passes a CBA test and drastically fails a WBA test is almost 
certainly a mistake, but a project that barely passes a WBA test and 
drastically fails a CBA test is likely undesirable as well.  Needless to 
say, we favor placing greater weight on well-being analysis for the 
 
                                                          
173 See generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods 
and the Theory of Groups (1965) (setting forth an interest-group theory of politics); 
cf. Visualizing Economics, Share of GDP for Bottom 99th, 95th, and 90th, available at 
http://visualecon.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/shareofgdp.gif 
(showing that the proportion of wealth held by the richest Americans has risen over 
the past 35 years and implying that wealth transfers from wealthy to poor have 
become less common over time).  
174 We thank Michael Livermore for suggesting this point to us. 
175 This amounts to an argument that WBA may be path-dependent.  Cf. 
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, supra note 14 
(arguing that CBA is not similarly path dependent, with the exception of projects and 
regulations that cause substantial unemployment).  
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many reasons set forth in this Article.  But we are not unmindful of the 
valuable role that CBA could play as a complement to WBA. 
 
3. Affective Forecasting Errors 
 
 a) Practical Difficulties 
 
 Some of the problems with CBA that we outline in the 
preceding sections—informational and computational difficulties, and 
wealth effects—could conceivably be cured via enormous 
expenditures on data collection and the use of extremely delicate and 
sophisticated statistical methods.176
However, revealed preference studies suffer in addition from a 
significant incurable flaw, one that WBA does not share.  The flaw is 
that they rely upon affective forecasting: predicting how an individual 
will feel about an event or a condition before it happens.  This is an 
activity that individuals often struggle greatly with.  Imagine a 
government project that improves air quality in a particular location.  
Suppose that an agency wishes to place a monetary value on this 
cleaner air using housing prices in a revealed preferences study.  The 
theory behind using housing prices to measure the value of this project 
is that individuals will pay more to live in the locality once air quality 
has been improved.  In theory, then, home prices in the affected area 
will depend upon how much both current homeowners
  No practitioner of CBA has come 
close to implementing these types of solutions, though they remain 
theoretically possible. 
177 and 
prospective purchasers value the improved air quality.178
                                                          
176 As we have discussed, some of these problems also implicate WBA, though 
not to the same degree. 
  Inevitably, 
these valuations require comparisons between what it is like to live in 
areas with better and worse air qualities.  Thus, the current homeowner 
must remember what the air was like before the improvement and 
estimate her welfare loss from returning to such a state; and the 
prospective homeowner must estimate how valuable the improved air 
will be to her in the future. 
177 Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Role of Hope in Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 
1661, 1666 (1997). 
178 Paul Boudreaux, An Individual Preference Approach to Suburban Racial 
Desegregation, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 533, 547 (1999). 
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 Study after psychological study has shown that both of these 
exercises are fraught with error.  Humans are notoriously bad at 
affective forecasting.179  And they have surprising difficulty even 
remembering how they felt about an event or condition long after it 
has passed.180  Although people usually do a good job of anticipating 
the valence of life events (i.e., whether they will be good or bad), they 
tend to make systematic errors about both the magnitude and duration 
of their affective responses to those events.181
 WBA, by contrast, will only require asking people about their 
current well-being.  The governmental agency can then compare the 
current well-being of a population that is receiving the benefits of 
some regulation with the well-being of that population (or a similar 
reference population) before the regulation was implemented to 
determine its impact.  These findings can then be applied to similar 
situations in other locations.  No prospective or retrospective 
judgments are necessary. 
 If individuals make 
significant errors when valuing some amenity, then CBA will similarly 
make significant errors when it adopts and incorporates those 
valuations. 
 Revealed preference studies in conjunction with wages and 
workplace conditions have precisely the same problem.  Imagine a job 
that comes with some undesirable working condition, such as an 
increased risk of contracting emphysema due to airborne chemicals in 
the workplace.  A typical wage study would compare the salary 
accompanying this job to the salary accompanying a comparable job 
that lacked the risk of emphysema.182
                                                          
179 See Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting: Knowing 
What to Want, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 131, 131 (2005) (“Research 
on affective forecasting has shown that people routinely mispredict how much 
pleasure or displeasure future events will bring and, as a result, sometimes work to 
bring about events that do not maximize their happiness.”); David A. Schkade & 
Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make People Happy? A Focusing 
Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI. 340, 344–45 (1998) 
(discussing affective forecasting errors). 
 
180 See Dylan M. Smith et al., Misremembering Colostomies? Former Patients 
Give Lower Utility Ratings Than Do Current Patients, 25 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 688, 
691 (2006) (describing difficulties with remembering affective states). 
181 Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 179, at 131. 
182 See Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the 
Pricing of Fear and Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 1024 (2004); Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L. REV. 2255, 2268–75 (2002) 
(explaining how the EPA developed its arsenic regulations under the Clinton 
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 This approach, like the housing study described above, relies 
on the predictions of employees regarding conditions with which they 
have no experience.  The hypothetical employee, asked to choose 
between the safer and riskier workplaces, would have to anticipate 
what it would be like for her to contract emphysema and then put a 
price on the risk of that occurring.  This is a significant cognitive 
hurdle.  This employee presumably does not already have emphysema, 
and she may not even know anyone who has ever contracted 
emphysema.  How, then, could she possibly forecast what it will be 
like?  The result is that agencies often exclude such risks from cost-
benefit analyses, treating them as if they did not exist.183
WBA simply avoids all of these difficulties.  Under WBA, 
researchers would ask people with and without emphysema to report 
on their current levels of well-being.
  Studies used 
to determine the value of a statistical life fare little better; how can an 
individual reliably estimate the value of his or her own life or what it 
would be like to lose it?  (We explain other problems with value-of-
life calculations in Part IV below.) 
184
                                                                                                                                         
administration); Office of Info. and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 
2011 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulation and 
Underfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, 18 (2011) (stating that 
OSHA developed its rule on occupational exposure to hexavalent chromium using 
$7 million value of life). 
  No prospective forecasts or 
retrospective judgments are necessary; the individual need only report 
her current feelings.  Researchers would then compare the well-being 
of people with emphysema to people without.  The differential is the 
hedonic cost of emphysema, which could then be plugged directly into 
a well-being analysis.  Because they eliminate any possibility of 
affective forecasting (or memory) errors, these contemporaneous self-
assessments are likely to be far more accurate than the guesses about 
183 See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, supra 
note 14 (describing a regulation in which the agency ignores certain health costs for 
lack of data); Office of Safety and Health Administration, Occupational Exposure to 
Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. 10100, 10307 (2006), codified at 29 CFR § § 
1910, 1915, 1917, 1918, 1929 (ignoring these risks). 
184 See, e.g., Powdthavee & Berg, supra note 124 (providing self-assessment 
data related to a variety of ailments).  The preferred method for collecting this data is 
to ask the same people for assessments of their own well-being before and after 
those people contract emphysema.  Large-scale data collection efforts like the British 
Household Panel Survey make this approach feasible, and Powdthavee & van den 
Berg rely on those types of sources.  See id. at 9. 
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the future and past that revealed preference studies demand.185
 
  At a 
practical level, well-being analysis thus offers significant advantages 
over revealed preference studies. 
 b) Philosophical Divergence  
 
The intractable practical problem presented by affective 
forecasting error is by itself a powerful reason to prefer WBA to CBA.  
But beyond even this important pragmatic concern, CBA’s difficulties 
with affective forecasting go to the heart of the philosophical 
difference between CBA and WBA.  Consider the wage studies that 
CBA uses to price lives.  Even if the wage premium reflects the actual 
guess people would make as to whether the money or the risk-
avoidance would give them more welfare, that guess may very well be 
mistaken.  The real questions are these: how much would the money 
improve someone’s enjoyment of life?; how much enjoyment of life 
would someone lose by dying younger than they otherwise would have 
died?; and how likely is it that a given regulation would save the 
person from that earlier death? 
The point is well illustrated by a famous CBA study by Kip 
Viscusi showing that cigarette smoking produces greater benefits than 
costs because it kills people before they reach the age at which the cost 
of their care would have become a drain on society.186  Another CBA 
study reached the same conclusion with respect to the Czech 
Republic.187
Why does Viscusi’s study reach a conclusion so far out of line 
with most people’s intuitions?  The reason is that it under-counts the 
significance of people’s deaths by assuming that their choice to smoke 
was in their own best interests.
 
188
                                                          
185 See supra Part II.B. 
  Viscusi carefully analyzes the 
possibility that people are uninformed about the dangers or that they 
186 W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of 
Smoking, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 4891 (1994).  Other 
scholars have ridiculed Viscusi’s conclusion that “‘cigarette smoking should be 
subsidized rather than taxed.’”  ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 72 
(quoting Viscusi, supra, at 33). 
187 Arthur D. Little International, Inc., Public Finance Balance of Smoking in the 
Czech Republic, available at 
http://hspm.sph.sc.edu/courses/Econ/Classes/cbacea/czechsmokingcost.html. 
188 Viscusi, supra note 186, at 19-29. 
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are unable to act on their preferences due to physical addiction.189  But 
he rejects those possibilities, citing evidence of the elasticity of 
demand for cigarettes190 and the survey evidence of people’s 
knowledge of the risks.191
This approach cannot be dismissed as the mere product of bias 
or motivated reasoning.
  For Viscusi, if people are choosing to 
smoke despite knowing that it is dangerous, then that must be because 
smoking and dying younger is better for those people than not 
smoking and living longer. 
192  Whatever Viscusi’s goals, his methodology 
is grounded in the bedrock principle of CBA and of welfare economics 
more generally: people do what is best for them.193
Suppose we could run the life of a person, Jill, on two parallel 
tracks.  On both tracks, Jill would choose to smoke if she could, and 
she does so on track one.  But on track two, cigarettes are unavailable, 
so she cannot use them.  On track one, Jill dies young, whereas on 
track two, she lives a long and healthy life.
  If there is 
something wrong with his conclusions, it is not because he misused 
CBA but because he used it.  The problem with the study, and the 
reason it reaches an unacceptable conclusion, is that preference-
satisfaction is not the same as welfare. 
194
                                                          
189 Id. 
  Her aggregate 
happiness, let us stipulate, is far greater on track two than on track 
one: this is the essential fact for WBA, and a fact that CBA deems 
irrelevant because it equates her choices with her well-being.  We 
believe it is difficult to deny that Jill had greater welfare on track two.  
And it is no mystery how she could have made choices contrary to her 
interests on track one: the past several decades of scholarship have 
190 Id. at 20-21. 
191 Id. at 23-27. 
192 Contra ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 41-42 (noting that 
Viscusi and other regulatory critics have “institutional homes” that are funded by “a 
Who’s Who of American industry”).  Along these same lines, the study of smoking 
in the Czech Republic, supra note 187, was commissioned by Philip Morris. 
193 See, e.g., J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 
696, 698 (1939) (“We assume each individual . . . to have a certain scale of 
preferences, and to regulate his activities in such a way as best to satisfy those 
preferences.”). 
194 At least in theory, on track two Jill may have lost some of the value she 
derived on track one from smoking cigarettes—i.e., if smoking is pleasurable for 
her—but few would dispute that this value is outweighed by the value of living far 
longer and experiencing countless more moments of happiness from other sources. 
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been directed at demonstrating as much.195
Thus CBA, which is linked inextricably with a preference-
satisfaction conception of well-being,
  This is affective 
forecasting error writ large. 
196 cannot account for the fact 
that people often make bad choices even if they are not rendered 
helpless by addiction or by ignorance of relevant information.  This 
weakness of CBA is a chief strength of WBA, because WBA connects 
welfare not with choices but with outcomes: whether people actually 
feel better and enjoy their lives more as a result of a policy decision.  
As we explained exhaustively in an earlier article, the quality of Jill’s 
experience of life better captures the concept of her well-being than 
does the degree to which her preferences are satisfied.197
 
 
B. Contingent Valuations 
 
Revealed preference studies are widely considered the best 
methodology for pricing costs and benefits.  However, economists 
cannot rely entirely on revealed preference studies because not all 
costs and benefits involve goods that are traded in markets.  Absent a 
market that can be used to set the price for a good, cost-benefit 
analysis must turn to contingent valuation studies: survey-based 
hypothetical questions regarding hypothetical payments for 
hypothetical projects.198
The economic costs of the exhaust systems might be easy to 
measure, but how can an agency determine the value of cleaner skies?  
  For example, imagine that the government is 
considering mandating the installation of improved automobile 
exhaust systems.  The primary effect of these systems would be to 
reduce the amount of smog emitted by cars, leading to less smog (and 
clearer skies) across the country. 
                                                          
195 E.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Daniel Kahneman 
& Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 344 
(1984); supra Part III.A.3.a. 
196 See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 10; Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, 
Welfare as Happiness, supra note 22, at 1627-28. 
197 Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, Welfare as Happiness, supra note 22 at 
1616-27. 
198 Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2311, 2315 (2002) (“The 
valuation is ‘contingent’ because the valuation produced is contingent upon the 
hypothetical market that was contrived. A famous example is the large-scale survey 
taken in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, which sought to elicit the monetary 
value citizens around the country placed on avoiding another comparable spill.”). 
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Individuals do not have opportunities to buy and sell units of clean sky 
for amounts of money.  (Indeed, government regulation exists in part 
because these sorts of transactions are sufficiently difficult that they do 
not occur.199)  An agency might attempt to use a sophisticated housing 
price study, as described in the previous section, but those types of 
studies are extremely difficult to implement and have never found 
widespread use in CBA.200
To their credit, contingent valuation surveys avoid many of the 
informational and computational problems that plague revealed 
preference studies.  Respondents need not know the risk presented, 
because it is stated in the contingent valuation survey.  There is no 
obvious possibility that they will respond to the risk other than by 
demanding more money, because the surveys do not allow for such 
actions.
  With no markets to scrutinize, and with no 
opportunity to determine WTP by examining revealed preferences, 
agencies are forced instead to employ contingent valuation surveys.  
These surveys simply ask people how much they would be willing to 
pay to receive a benefit (such as cleaner skies) or to avoid a harm, with 
little additional guidance.   
201
Yet despite these advantages, contingent valuation surveys are 
nonetheless riddled with serious, perhaps decisive, flaws.
  And by asking directly how much a respondent would pay 
to avoid a risk or obtain a benefit, contingent valuation surveys 
eliminate the need for difficult regression analysis. 
202
 
  The 
sections that follow describe in detail those problems, and the 
corresponding advantages of WBA’s methodologies. 
1. Hypothetical Questions 
 
 Not surprisingly, the problems with contingent valuation 
surveys center around the fact that they necessarily involve 
hypothetical questions.  Subjects are asked to speculate about how 
much they would be willing to pay without having actually to pay 
                                                          
199 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit 
Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1118 (2000). 
200 See supra Section III.A.2; Malani, supra note 163.  
201 See supra Section III.A.1. 
202 See John M. Heyde, Comment, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the Trouble?, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 343 (1995) (summarizing criticisms of contingent 
valuation); Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 147, at 1558. 
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anything, which renders their speculation less trustworthy.203  Subjects 
are rarely subject to any budget constraint: they can state freely that 
they would be willing to pay $1 million for cleaner skies without 
worrying about the other projects that would go unfunded as a result of 
such expenditures.204  Subjects are asked frequently asked about topics 
they may know little or nothing about—for instance, how much they 
would pay to avoid persistent construction noise that they have never 
before experienced.205  This implicates all of the insurmountable 
problems related to affective forecasting that we described in the 
preceding section.206  When real money and real experiences are not at 
stake, individual statements about willingness to pay are simply 
unreliable.  Economists have long understood this point.207
These weaknesses in contingent valuation surveys have 
predictably resulted in prices that are all over the map.  To take just 
one example: contingent valuation surveys have set the value of a 
statistical life anywhere from $40,000 to $13 million.
  But CBA 
cannot avoid such hypothetical surveys because market transactions do 
not exist for all potential costs and benefits. 
208
Other tests of the validity of contingent valuation surveys have 
produced results that similarly fail to inspire confidence.  For instance, 
willingness-to-pay should be proportional to the size of the benefit 
conferred or the risk reduced.  That is, if people are willing to pay 
$1000 to eliminate a 1/1000 mortality risk, they should be willing to 
pay $5000 to eliminate a 5/1000 risk.
 
209  Yet numerous studies have 
shown that this is not the case; individual willingness-to-pay does not 
scale proportionately with the size of the risk reduction.210
                                                          
203 Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 
269, 317 (1989) (“Because people have little experience placing monetary value on 
unpriced natural resources, survey results may be hypothetical and inaccurate.”). 
  For 
204 See Heyde, supra note 202, at 345-48. 
205 See id. 
206 See supra Section III.A.1. 
207 See Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some 
Number Better than No Number?, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 49 (1994) (discussing the 
recurrent problems with contingent valuation surveys and providing an overview of 
alternative explanations for the responses given in willingness-to-pay questions). 
208 EPA, supra note 105, at 82-83.  The EPA also conducted a meta-analysis of 
forty contingent valuation surveys of the value of life.  The standard deviation of the 
value of life among those forty surveys was over $3 million.  Id. (standard deviation 
calculated by author). 
209 See Cropper et al., supra note 156, at 327.  
210 See id. (surveying the literature). 
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instance, in one study respondents were only willing to pay 1.6 times 
as much to reduce a 5/1000 risk as they were to reduce a 1/1000 
risk.211  Many contingent valuation studies do not even include this 
type of validity test.  In one recent meta-analysis of forty studies 
contingent valuation studies, only 50% of them incorporated a test for 
validity.212  Of those that did include such a test, only 15% of the 
studies “passed” the test, in the sense that WTP was “nearly 
proportional to the risk reduction.”213
One of the principal strengths of WBA is that it need not rely 
upon such hypothetical inquiries.  Instead, WBA compares 
individuals’ contemporaneous levels of happiness before and after an 
actual project is completed and then uses that information to make 
projections regarding future projects.  The surveyed individuals need 
not speculate as to how much money they would pay, and they are not 
subject to all of the biases and distortions that asking hypothetical 
questions regarding money might generate.  Rather, they are simply 
asked to state their current level of well-being—a question that has 
been demonstrated to produce consistently reliable and valid 
answers.
  It is hard to put much faith in 
policy made on the basis of studies such as these. 
214
 Of course, in some cases it may be difficult to isolate the 
hedonic effects of clean skies amidst all of the other confounding 
variables.  For instance, the same jurisdiction that has cleaner skies 
might also have lower unemployment rates, which could itself 
generate greater well-being.  Agencies will need to employ 
sophisticated multivariate regression analysis, as we describe above in 
  For instance, in order to estimate the value of clean skies, 
an agency would collect data on well-being in a location with clean 
skies and a location with smog-filled skies—or, better yet, in the same 
location before and after it initiates some project that will lead to 
cleaner skies.  By comparing well-being figures with and without 
clean skies, economists could measure the welfare benefits of reducing 
smog.  These benefits could then be compared with the economic 
costs. 
                                                          
211 Anna Alberini et al., Does the Value of a Statistical Life Vary With Age and 
Health Status? Evidence From the US and Canada, 48 J. ENVIRON. ECON. MANAG. 
769 (2004). 
212 Cropper et al., supra note 156, at 328 (citing EPA, supra note 105). 
213 Id. 
214 ED DIENER ET AL., supra note 71, at 71-73. 
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Part II.215
However, complicated regression analysis will not always be 
necessary.  Agencies will often be able to employ intrapersonal data—
essentially, longitudinal studies—to circumvent many of the problems 
with multivariate regression we described in the previous section.  For 
instance, suppose that an agency wished to evaluate the benefits of a 
project that would reduce commute times by upgrading public transit 
systems.  Rather than relying on erratic contingent valuation surveys—
or trying to isolate how much people are willing to pay for shorter 
commutes by examining housing prices or wages—WBA would 
simply determine the well-being of individuals as they are in the 
process of commuting.  It would then compare that number to those 
individuals’ well-being when they are engaged in some leisure 
activity—whatever they might have more time for if their commutes 
were shortened.  The difference between those two figures, aggregated 
over the total reduction in commuting times, is the welfare gain from 
such a project.  The results that WBA will generate are likely to be 
more reliable than those that contingent valuation surveys (or revealed 
preference studies) are currently producing.
   Yet even where regression analysis is necessary, at most it 
will present practical hurdles that can be surmounted with adequate 
data and analysis.   
216
  
 
2. Wealth Effects 
 
 Because they involve asking individuals how much they would 
pay for a benefit (or to avoid a cost), contingent valuation surveys will 
suffer from all of the same wealth effects described in the section on 
revealed preference studies.217
                                                          
215 See supra Part II; see also Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 
  Respondents will necessarily filter 
their responses through the lens of their own finances: a wealthy 
person might think nothing of paying $10,000 for cleaner skies, while 
76, at S232 
(providing an example of sophisticated multivariate regression being used to isolate 
the effect of one factor on happiness). 
216 As a matter of last recourse, WBA could also ask individuals to predict their 
well-being if they were to receive some benefit or suffer some harm.  This would be 
the contingent valuation version of WBA, and as such it would be subject to all of 
the problems with affective forecasting and hypothetical questions we describe here.  
But at least it would circumvent issues related to wealth and the translation of 
welfare into dollars, see infra Section III.B.2, and thus even this approach might well 
be superior to standard contingent valuation studies. 
217 See supra Section III.A.2. 
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a poorer individual would be highly unlikely to suggest such a price.  
Of course, these prices are decoupled to some degree from individual 
wealth because contingent valuation surveys do not actually require 
respondents to pay anything.  But this is a disadvantage, not an 
advantage.  Instead of values that are distorted somewhat by wealth, 
contingent valuation surveys produce values that are distorted 
significantly by their hypothetical nature.218
Contingent valuation surveys do offer one additional 
mechanism for combating wealth effects.  Unlike revealed preference 
studies, contingent valuation surveys can average WTP values across 
an entire population.
 
219
There are undoubtedly advantages to using average WTP 
values, but even that approach has significant limitations.  First, the 
population of people affected by some potential government action 
may not be “average.”  For instance, imagine a project that would 
produce cleaner skies over Los Angeles.  CBA would run into 
significant problems if it attempted to gauge the value of this project 
by surveying all Californians regarding their willingness to pay for 
improved air quality.  Many of the surveyed individuals would live in 
areas that already have clean air, and would thus value a project to 
improve air quality less than a typical Los Angeleno.  Consequently, a 
survey that encompassed all Californians would understate the benefits 
of cleaner skies in Los Angeles in particular. 
  For instance, in order to determine the value 
of clean air to the people of California, a California agency might 
survey a representative cross-section of California citizens at all levels 
of income and wealth.  The resulting value would represent the 
average willingness of all Californians to pay for clean air.  This 
option is typically unavailable in revealed preference studies because 
it is rare that a true cross-section of the population purchases the same 
good in the same marketplace.  For instance, wealthy people generally 
do not take jobs that involve a risk of death.  Accordingly, essentially 
all wage studies involve only working-class respondents. 
Second, average WTP values provide no information as to 
where a potential project should be sited when there are multiple 
possibilities that might affect different populations of people.  More 
generally, they are not useful in deciding between similar projects that 
                                                          
218 See supra Section III.B.1. 
219 Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 147, at 1558 (“Researchers ask a cross 
section of the affected population how much they would be willing to pay to 
preserve or protect something that can't be bought in a store.”). 
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affect different populations.  The only workable approach in such a 
situation is to evaluate the actual effect of the project on the different 
groups, a task that cannot be accomplished using average WTP values. 
As we described above, WBA avoids the problems caused by 
wealth effects because it does not require translating costs and benefits 
into dollars.  By relying directly on self-evaluations of well-being, 
WBA simply sidesteps the biases and errors that are introduced when 
individuals are asked to price non-monetary goods.  To be certain, 
WBA relies requires aggregating interpersonal welfare states, and 
there is no guarantee that each individual is reporting her welfare 
identically on any given scale.  Yet there is no reason to believe that 
these self-reports will be systematically biased in any given direction, 
and differences should wash out over large sample sizes, as we 
explained above.220
  
  The same cannot be said for wealth effects and 
CBA. 
C. Willingness-to-Pay Measures and WBA: A Summary 
 
What all of this means is that CBA will have great difficulties 
in pricing costs and benefits via either revealed preference or 
contingent valuation studies.221
WBA, by contrast, has no such problem.  Instead of trying to 
isolate the amount of money that some individual might demand in 
return for accepting a low-probability risk to her life, or might 
hypothetically be willing to pay for some uncertain benefit, WBA 
simply adds up the positive experiences of life that individuals stand to 
lose or gain under a given project.  For instance, in order to evaluate a 
regulation that reduces the risk of death from some workplace safety 
hazard, WBA would aggregate the positive experiences that would be 
  This is a decisive problem because the 
pricing of non-monetary goods is essential—even central—to CBA.  
Nearly every governmental regulation or project will produce some 
non-monetary benefits and costs, and in many cases the non-monetary 
benefits (reducing risks to life, in particular) form the entire basis for 
the regulation.  Accordingly, the difficulties inherent in converting 
costs and benefits to dollars that we described here will necessarily 
limit the accuracy and usefulness of CBA as a welfarist decision 
procedure.  
                                                          
220 See supra Part II.B. 
221 CBA’s less common alternative for valuing life, contingent-valuation 
surveys, is inferior to WBA on grounds we discuss in Part III. 
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lost if an individual were to die early222
To be sure, WBA’s process is imperfect in practice.  It relies 
on self-reports as proxies for well-being, because science has not yet 
provided us with a perfect hedonimeter.
 and then multiply that total by 
the odds of early death.  After multiplying the resulting number by the 
number of people affected by a proposed regulation, regulators would 
then compare it with whatever diminution in positivity may be 
associated with enacting the regulation (due to increased consumer 
costs or some other factor). 
223  Moreover, it relies on 
estimates of likely outcomes, and it provides only a window into 
expected human well-being without resolving how to weigh that 
against other potential values.  But relying on estimated outcomes is as 
much a feature of CBA or anything else as it is of WBA: no one can 
predict the future with certainty.  Similarly, CBA like WBA is merely 
a gauge of human welfare that does not resolve or factor in welfare-
unrelated considerations.  The only unique disadvantage of WBA is its 
reliance on self-reports as proxies, but that imperfection is dwarfed by 
those of CBA, which uses proxies such as the wage premium that are 
far more removed from actual well-being.224
 
 
IV. WBA MEASURES THE VALUE OF LIVES WITH GREATER NUANCE 
AND ACCURACY THAN DOES CBA 
 
 When a regulation would save lives, the value of those lives 
must be assessed so that the value of saving them can be compared 
with the costs necessary to do so.225
                                                          
222 Had the person lived, she would have experienced many moments that were 
instead extinguished by her death.  WBA would aggregate the expected number and 
average level of positivity of those moments in order to determine how much 
positive life experience her early death deprived her of. 
  In Parts I and III, we discussed 
the basic mechanisms by which CBA determines the value of a life.  In 
Part IV, we now explore the many subtleties that those mechanisms 
ignore and the ways in which WBA accounts for those subtleties. 
223 Cf. F.Y. EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS: AN ESSAY ON THE 
APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICS TO THE MORAL SCIENCES 98-102 (London, C. 
Kagan Paul & Co. 1881); Colander, supra note 70, at 216–19. 
224 Cf. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, Welfare as Happiness, supra note 22, at 
1630-32, 1636. 
225 Some may find it distasteful to place a value on saving a life, but where 
policy choices must be made and tradeoffs are necessary, there is no alternative.  
Any decision will involve such a valuation, so it is a virtue that CBA and WBA 
make their valuations explicit rather than hidden. 
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 For CBA, every death is counted as equivalent to every other 
death.226  A slow, painful death is the same as a quick death in one’s 
sleep.  The deaths caused by a terrorist attack are the same as those 
that occur in skiing accidents.  And the death of a 12-year-old is the 
same as that of a 90-year-old.227
 
  Moreover, CBA counts all lives 
equivalently. A life with a debilitating but non-fatal disease counts as 
much as a life with perfect health. The problem with all of these 
equivalencies is that they affect overall welfare differently, and CBA’s 
stated purpose (like that of WBA) is to measure overall welfare.  
Because WBA accounts for the actual effects on welfare of different 
types of life-saving regulations, it measures the “benefit” side of the 
ledger more accurately than does CBA. 
A. Not All Types of Death Are Equivalent 
 
1. Different Types of Threats to Life 
 
 When policymakers consider whether a proposed health and 
safety regulation is worth its cost, the standard cost-benefit approach is 
to consider how many lives are actually likely to be saved.228  This 
approach, which differentiates among risks only in the quantitative 
terms of their likelihood and magnitude, is widely favored by 
proponents of CBA.229
                                                          
226 Recent tweaks to CBA have, on occasion, made slight ameliorations to this 
problem.  But as we discuss in Part IV.C infra, these improvements are far less 
effective than is WBA at solving the problem. 
  Indeed, those proponents treat this approach as 
227 Endless arguments could be made on each side about the moral validity of 
equating the deaths of the young with those of the old, but CBA cannot avail itself of 
those arguments.  Like WBA, CBA is simply a tool for measuring aggregate welfare.  
Its conclusions, like those of WBA, purport to tell us whether a regulation increases 
or decreases quality of life on the whole.  Once that verdict is in, policymakers can 
decide what to do with it, and their decision may well involve making welfare-
independent moral judgments.  But when analyzing aggregate welfare alone, as CBA 
does, it is indefensible to equate preserving one year of life with preserving eighty 
years of life.  The latter unquestionably increases welfare more than does the former, 
for precisely the reason that saving a life at all increases welfare: it grants more time 
to live. 
228 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 130. 
229 STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE 
RISK REGULATION 61-63 (1993); Timur Kuran & Cass Sunstein, Availability 
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 753 (1999); John D. Graham, 
Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress, in ROBERT W. HAHN ED., RISKS, 
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a strength precisely because it elevates true dangerousness over public 
misperceptions thereof.230
Critics of CBA, however, have attacked this approach by 
pointing out the degree to which it is at odds with people’s actual 
views of risk and actual preferences toward regulation.
 
231  For 
example, a CBA analysis by Robert Hahn in 1996 indicated that the 
number of lives likely to be saved by increased airline security was far 
too low to justify the expense.232  Of course, this analysis did not 
foresee the attacks of September 11, 2001; but the more interesting 
issue surrounds what the analysis would have concluded if it had 
foreseen those attacks.  As Ackerman and Heinzerling note, the 
number of people (about 3,000) who died on September 11 is dwarfed 
by the number who die from many other causes that are potential 
subjects of regulation.233  Hahn’s study itself suggests that “side 
impact standards for automobiles and cabin fire protection in aircraft,” 
which are “two-hundred times more cost-effective” than proposals for 
safeguarding airplanes from terrorism, may well have been favored by 
CBA under any circumstances.234  For critics, this demonstrates 
CBA’s inadequacy.235
It seems very likely that most Americans would prefer to have 
thwarted the 9/11 attacks even if doing so had required public 
expenditures that could have saved lives more efficiently if directed 
elsewhere.  Such a preference would accord with other findings about 
the way people perceive risk.
 
236  Rather than focusing only on the 
likelihood and magnitude of harm, they also consider the nature of the 
risk.237  “When a hazard is unfamiliar, uncontrollable, involuntary, 
inequitable, dangerous to future generations, irreversible, man-made, 
and/or catastrophic, ordinary people are likely to view it as risky,”238
                                                                                                                                         
COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 183 (1996); Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About 
Personal Risks, 245 SCIENCE 1232, 1232 (1989). 
 
whereas “a hazard that is familiar, controllable, voluntary, equitable, 
230 Supra note 229. 
231 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 123-52. 
232 Robert W. Hahn, The Cost of Antiterrorist Rhetoric, 19 REGULATION 51, 54 
(1996). 
233 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 123-24. 
234 Hahn, supra note 232, at 54. 
235 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 123-24, 136-38. 
236 Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 282 (1987). 
237 Id. 
238 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 130. 
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dangerous only to the present generation, reversible, natural, and/or 
diffusely harmful is unlikely to generate much concern in the 
populace.”239  These views raise important questions about how to 
regulate public health and safety.  Many regulatory matters such as 
those involving nuclear power and toxic waste would be resolved one 
way via CBA and a very different way via the views of the public.240
 What WBA adds to the picture is a way of counting the crucial 
fact that people’s feelings about risk—not just the statistical 
probability of the risk—affect their well-being.
 
241  “Prolonged 
exposure to dreaded risks frequently leads to deep and widespread 
anxiety, depression, and distrust.”242  In cataloging these effects, one 
scholar has noted the anger, confusion, and fear produced by the 
risks,243 as well as their deleterious effects on couples244 and 
children.245  Another scholar has written at length bout the “trauma” 
imposed by dreaded risks.246  Yet another scholar focuses on the 
breakdown of trust that those risks tend to cause.247
 These tangible effects on people clearly must be counted by 
any tool that aims to measure well-being.  Indeed, even the CBA study 
by Hahn that argued against airplane anti-terrorism measures 
acknowledged the possibility that people might “benefit 
psychologically” from such measures.
 
248  That study further 
acknowledged: “It may be that people are willing to pay large sums to 
feel safer,” but it concluded that “absent concrete research supporting 
this assertion, the money would be far better spent” elsewhere.249
                                                          
239 Id. 
 
240 Slovic, supra note 236, at 285. 
241 Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 
2025, 2036-37 (1999). 
242 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 131. 
243 MICHAEL EDELSTEIN, CONTAMINATED COMMUNITIES: THE SOCIAL AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF RESIDENTIAL TOXIC EXPOSURE 44-46 (1988). 
244 Id. at 93-95 (noting that, for example, “[s]pouses sometimes held their mates 
responsible for getting them into the situation or for their coping strategy,” 
frequently resulting in substantial “marital strife”). 
245 Id. at 98-105. 
246 KAI ERIKSON, A NEW SPECIES OF TROUBLE: EXPLORATIONS IN DISASTER, 
TRAUMA AND COMMUNITY 226-42 (1994). 
247 Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 675, 
677-80 (1993). 
248 Hahn, supra note 232, at 54. 
249 Id. 
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 In stark contrast to studies like that one, WBA can be used to 
forecast the effects of regulation on people’s well-being.  By using 
hedonic data from communities that have been subjected to the 
relevant risks, WBA captures the harms that CBA has been so 
extensively criticized for missing.  The reason that people’s qualitative 
judgments of risks matter is that those judgments themselves 
influence, sometimes profoundly, people’s experience of life.  Such 
influence is the thing that WBA exists to measure. 
 It is essential to note that WBA does not ignore the actual 
likelihood and magnitude of harm on which CBA focuses.  Actual 
deaths, of course, eliminate well-being and are thus profoundly 
weighted in any WBA calculus.  This is especially significant because 
the harshest critics of CBA, in pushing for a more democratic 
approach to risk assessment, can be insufficiently sensitive to 
quantitative measures.  Hazards that are “familiar,” “equitable,” and 
“natural”250
 
 still ought to be taken very seriously if they are likely to 
kill many people.  So WBA provides an appropriate mediating 
measure between the critics’ focus on psychological triggers of risk 
and the lament of CBA practitioners that the public is simply 
irrational. 
2. Different Types of Death 
 
CBA also chooses not to differentiate between quick deaths 
and slow, painful ones,251 and this weakness of CBA reveals one of 
WBA’s greatest strengths.  The reason that people hope to avoid 
painful deaths is, simply and obviously, that people dislike pain 
because it decreases their well-being.  If we hold constant the time at 
which a person will die252 and contrast two different sets of 
“circumstances preceding death”253
                                                          
250 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 
—one in which the person is in 
pain and miserable, and the other in which the person is pain-free and 
relatively happy—several things become clear: (i) the person is better 
off in the second scenario; (ii) the reason for this is that she feels better 
9, at 130. 
251 Id. at 71 (“[T]he circumstances preceding death are important: sudden, 
painless death in pleasant circumstances is different from agonizing, slow 
deterioration surrounded by medical technology.”). 
252 If the time of death would actually differ, such that a slow death would 
increase the length of life, then of course this should be factored in as well.  WBA 
does factor it in, whereas CBA does not.  See infra Part IV.C. 
253 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 71. 
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in the second scenario; (iii) the amount by which she is better off is the 
amount by which she feels better, multiplied by the amount of time 
during which she feels better; and (iv) the better a tool of analysis 
takes account of these facts, the better it captures the likely effects of a 
policy on human well-being.  WBA is designed precisely to account 
for these considerations.   CBA ignores them in practice, and even in 
theory it could address such concerns only via proxies that are far less 
reliable and more indirect than those of WBA. 
 
B. Quantifying and Counting Existence Benefits 
 
 The primary focus of this Part is CBA’s limitations in 
analyzing measures that save human life.  But it is worth taking a brief 
detour to point out the equally severe flaws in CBA’s approach to 
quantifying the benefits of measures that save the lives of non-human 
animals.  When an environmental regulation would save animals, one 
category of benefit created is the use that people would get from those 
animals.  CBA can attach prices to the amount that people “use” 
whales when they pay for tours designed to watch them,254 or to the 
value a fisherman gets from having fish available for him to catch and 
sell.255  But there is overwhelming evidence that people want 
government to spend money to save animals for reasons that relate to 
those animals’ existence rather than just to the way in which people 
will use them.256
 CBA has severe problems in accounting for such existence 
benefits.  If it counts them at all,
 
257
                                                          
254 See ERICH HOYT, WHALE WATCHING 2001: WORLDWIDE TOURISM 
NUMBERS, EXPENDITURES, AND EXPANDING SOCIOECONOMIC BENEFITS 7, available 
at http://www.cetaceanhabitat.org/pdf_bin/hoyt_ww_2001_report.pdf. 
 it must rely on contingent-
255  National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Proposed Regulations to 
Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing 
Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,122, 17,149 (Apr. 9, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
9). 
256 E.g., John B. Loomis and Douglas S. White, Economic Benefits of Rare and 
Endangered Species: Summary and Meta-Analysis, 18 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 
197, 203 (1996). 
257 Sometimes it does not count them at all.  ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra 
note 9, at 172 (“What is the value of the natural capital, the [fish] that would have 
gotten away?  Zero, according to EPA’s cost-benefit analysis (or perhaps according 
to OMB’s marching orders to the agency).”).  This is clearly at odds with CBA’s 
own preference-satisfaction theory of well-being, because people express strong 
preferences for saving animals’ lives. 
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valuation surveys to assess the amount of money people are willing to 
spend in order to save these animals, or the amount people would need 
to be paid in order to allow the animals to die.  But in addition to the 
other problems associated with such surveys,258 they fare particularly 
poorly in the context of existence benefits.  For one thing, people often 
resist responding to the survey questions due to an inability or 
unwillingness to assign monetary prices to animals’ lives.259  Simply 
ignoring the non-responders, as CBA does, seems very likely to lead 
to results skewed downward from the actual average preference for 
how those lives should be valued.  Moreover, even the responders are 
forced into a minefield of cognitive limitations.  A famous study 
indicates that people would be willing to pay similar amounts to 
prevent the deaths of, respectively, 2,000, 20,000, or 200,000 
migratory birds – a phenomenon known as “scope neglect.”260  Failing 
to count people’s preference for avoiding animal deaths is inconsistent 
with CBA’s preference-satisfaction model,261
 Ackerman and Heinzerling devote a full chapter of their book 
to existence benefits,
 but CBA is ill-equipped 
to measure and incorporate those preferences. 
262 and their primary objection to CBA on this 
score is that it fails to account for the moral dimension of people’s 
preferences.263  Indeed, to the extent that CBA is solely concerned 
with human welfare and defines welfare so as to exclude preferences 
for things outside of one’s direct experience,264
                                                          
258 See Part III.B, supra. 
 it does not incorporate 
existence benefits.  That said, a refined version of the theory on which 
CBA rests could be aimed at measuring human welfare while 
acknowledging that its results must be weighed against welfare-
unrelated values.  Such an approach, dubbed “weak welfarism” and 
259 Judy Clark et al., “I Struggled with This Money Business”: Respondents’ 
Perspectives on Contingent Valuation, 33 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 45 (2000); see 
also ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 164. 
260 WILLIAM H. DESVOUGES ET AL., MEASURING NON-USE DAMAGES USING 
CONTINGENT VALUATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF ACCURACY 66 
(1992). 
261 See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 10, at 190 (“Modern economists hold 
that utility refers to the extent to which a person satisfies his or her (unrestricted) 
preferences.”). 
262 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 153-78. 
263 E.g., id. at 162. 
264 See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 10, at 34 (advocating for excluding remote 
benefits such as the survival of animals from the welfare calculus if such survival is 
not specifically known to the people whose welfare is being measured). 
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advocated by Eric Posner and Matthew Adler,265 would solve the 
problem of failing to account for people’s moral values with respect to 
existence benefits.  WBA’s analogous approach of weak hedonism 
would do the same.266
 But the moral issue is not the only dimension of the problem 
involved in counting existence benefits.  Another dimension is 
counting the actual harm people suffer from knowing that the animals 
died, or the benefit they accrue from knowing that the animals lived.  
Both orthodox welfarists
 
267 and adherents of a refined CBA268
 WBA, on the other hand, can solve this problem.  By gathering 
data on people’s reported well-being both before and after endangered 
animals are killed or saved, for example, WBA can measure the effect 
of existence benefits on welfare.  This intractable and indeed 
unsolvable problem for CBA is thus accounted for straightforwardly 
by WBA.  It represents precisely the sort of question that WBA is 
designed to answer. 
 are 
committed to the proposition that such harm matters, yet CBA cannot 
count it: contingent-valuation surveys are simply not up to the task, 
and they are the only option within CBA’s monetization framework. 
 WBA’s superiority in counting existence benefits goes beyond 
whales and birds: it extends to human beings themselves.  CBA counts 
a person’s death only as extinguishing her own welfare, thereby 
ignoring the effects the death may have on the welfare of others.   
Ackerman and Heinzerling explain this problem with CBA as follows: 
 
Another problem with the standard approach to 
valuation is that it asks individuals (either directly 
through surveys, or indirectly through observing wage 
and job choices . . .) only about their attitudes toward 
risk to themselves. . . .  If [the question of existence 
values] makes sense for bald eagles and national parks, 
it must be at least as important when applied to safe 
drinking water and working conditions for other people. 
. . .  We are not aware of any attempts to quantify the 
existence value of another person’s life; but we are sure 
                                                          
265 Id. at 52-61. 
266 Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, Welfare as Happiness, supra note 22, at 
1589-90. 
267 E.g., Hicks, supra note 193, at 698. 
268 ADLER & POSNER, supra note 10, at 34. 
 
 
 
 
 WELL-BEING ANALYSIS VS. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 69 
that, if the value of life is a number in the first place, 
then there is a substantial existence value to the life of a 
stranger, let alone a relative or friend.269
 
 
Once again, the design of WBA is tailored to account naturally 
for such considerations.  Scholars have already collected data on the 
hedonic effects of others’ deaths, and, unsurprisingly, they are 
significant.270
 
  By excluding the value people place on others, CBA is 
ignoring hundreds of thousands of dollars in benefits from lives saved 
by regulation. In contrast, using hedonic data to assess proposed 
regulations fits neatly within WBA’s established framework.  This is a 
significant advantage, because CBA’s failure to count these effects as 
losses systemically skews downward its assessment of the harms 
associated with policies that cause or allow death.  Put simply, WBA 
provides a more accurate accounting of welfare than does CBA. 
C. CBA’s Attempted Improvements 
 
 When considering whether or not to regulate a risk to human 
health, CBA quantifies the value of that risk primarily by determining 
the number of lives likely to be saved by regulation and multiplying it 
by the statistical value of a human life.  The value of a statistical life 
(VSL) is computed using the various methods described in Parts I and 
III.  Accordingly, its reliability suffers from the methodological limits 
discussed above.  In addition, CBA’s use of statistical lives also has 
significant conceptual faults.  When determining an average value for 
lives saved, VSL treats the lives saved by regulation indiscriminately.  
In doing so, it ignores essential data regarding both the length and 
quality of the lives protected.  Regulations that prolong or improve the 
quality of life without “saving” it are not counted by CBA formulas 
relying on VSL.271
 In recent years, scholars and policymakers have developed new 
tools to overcome VSL’s limitations.  This section discusses two such 
 
                                                          
269 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 69-70. 
270 E.g., Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 76, at S217 (“This paper presents a 
study of the impact upon a person's happiness of the death of a loved one—
especially a child, a spouse, or a parent.”). 
271 As we explain below, no regulation actually saves lives; it merely prolongs 
them. To the extent that CBA focuses on saving lives, it is measuring the value of 
lives that presumably would have ended more or less immediately without the 
regulation. 
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tools —“value of statistical life years” (VSLYs) and “quality-adjusted 
life years” (QALYs).  The movement toward VSLYs and QALYs 
represents an acknowledgment of the limitations of traditional CBA 
methods.  The inadequacy of equating all lives saved with one another 
is the impetus for moving beyond VSL.  But VSLYs and QALYs are 
merely way stations on the road from CBA to WBA.  They are efforts 
to bend CBA to be more sensitive to the nuances it has been ignoring.  
But no such tweaks can solve the problem as comprehensively as can 
WBA, as the following sections explain. 
 
1. Statistical Lives and Life Years 
  
 When standard CBA is applied to regulations that seek to 
protect human health and welfare, policymakers calculate the 
“benefits” side of the equation by predicting the number of lives likely 
to be saved by the proposed regulation.272  In order to compare the 
number of lives saved to the costs of the regulation (e.g., in higher 
prices, unemployment, etc), the value of those lives must be 
monetized.  Thus, each life saved must be assigned a specific 
monetary value. CBA derives this value—known as the value of a 
statistical life (VSL)—by reference to the various techniques discussed 
in Parts I and III: revealed preference and contingent valuation 
studies.273  For example, if people receive an average of $800 in 
hazard pay to compensate them for facing a 1 in 10,000 chance of 
death, the value of a statistical life would equal $800 × 10,000 = $8 
million.274  By combining the results of a number of these kinds of 
studies, EPA has determined VSL to be $6.3 million in year 2000 
dollars.275
 As noted above, the techniques used to derive VSL have 
considerable methodological limitations.
  Accordingly, a proposed regulation that would save 100 
lives but cost $1 billion dollars would not be approved ($6.3 million × 
100 = $630 million < $1 billion).  
276  Perhaps more 
importantly, however, the conceptual relationship between VSL and 
the welfare-maximizing goals of regulation are deeply strained.277
                                                          
272 See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 
  By 
10, at 47. 
273 Id. at 47-49. 
274 This example is taken from Revesz and Livermore, id. at 49. 
275 Id. 
276 See infra Part III. 
277 We do not here discuss other extra-welfarist goals of regulation. 
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focusing solely on lives saved, CBA’s use of VSL entirely ignores 
data that are relevant to judging the value of regulation.  Regulation, 
after all, never saves lives (in the sense that people do not die); it 
merely prolongs lives.278
 In response to these kinds of problems, scholars have 
suggested that regulators consider instead the number of “life-years” at 
issue.
  By ignoring longevity, CBA risks creating 
highly counter-intuitive results.  Imagine, for example, that the 
government has a finite supply of a vaccine for a deadly disease that 
has recently broken out, and it can provide that vaccine either to 100 
children or 101 hospice patients.  Under CBA, using the VSL 
approach, the government should prefer to give the drug to the hospice 
patients, because doing so would potentially save one additional life.  
We doubt, however, that anyone would suggest that giving the vaccine 
to the hospice patients increases overall welfare.  After all, the benefit 
from the drug will likely only prolong the lives of the hospice patients 
for a few weeks, while the children might be expected to live for 
decades. 
279  Rather than relying simply on statistical lives, researchers 
would instead calculate the value of a statistical life year (VSLY), 
which involves dividing the VSL by the average life expectancy of the 
subjects of the studies.280  Agencies that use VSLY currently employ a 
value of approximately $180,000.281  Looking again at the vaccine 
example from the perspective of VSLY, the answer is obvious and 
intuitive: 100 children × 50 life-years per child × $180,000 = $90 
million; 101 hospice patients × 0.1 life-years per patient × $180,000 = 
$1.8 million.  By considering the number of life years saved by 
regulation, the VSLY method offers a closer proxy for the actual 
welfare value at stake.282
                                                          
278 Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 205, 208 (2004). 
 
279 Id. at 206 (“[I]t is sensible to think that government should consider not 
simply the number of lives at stake, or the VSL; it should concern itself also or 
instead with the number of life-years at stake, or the value of statistical life-years 
(VSLY).”) 
280 REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 10, at 78. 
281 Id.  
282 Sunstein, supra note 278, at 208 (“If the goal is to promote people’s welfare 
by lengthening their lives, a regulation that saves five-hundred life-years (and, les us 
say, twenty-five people) is, other things being equal, better than a regulation that 
saves fifty life-years (also, let us say, twenty-five people.”). 
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 Nonetheless, the VSLY approach has been criticized both for 
its lack of empirical support and the potential outcomes that it 
generates.283  These concerns are based on the claim that VSLY 
inappropriately undervalues the lives of older people.  Empirically, in 
surveys of WTP to avoid risk, there is mixed evidence about whether 
older people actually value risk less than younger people, as VSLY 
would suggest.284  Although some studies show that willingness to pay 
to avoid risk declines with age, as one might expect, some show no 
difference and others show the inverse.285  According to Richard 
Revesz and Michael Livermore, the failure to observe a decrease in 
WTP should not be surprising in light of the typically higher wealth of 
older people and the greater scarcity of the limited years they have 
remaining.286
 In situations where the data appear to diverge from the theory, 
however, it is just as possible that the data are misleading than that the 
theory is incorrect.  There are a number of plausible explanations for 
the finding, that older people are sometimes willing to pay more to 
avoid risk than younger people, that do not undermine the idea that 
saving more life-years saves more welfare.  For example, as Revesz 
and Livermore note, older people typically have greater wealth than 
younger people do, and wealth is strongly correlated with increased 
WTP.  But, as we argue in Part III, the enhanced WTP of older people 
should be treated as a confounding wealth effect rather than evidence 
of welfare.  Additionally, older people have less to do with their 
money and fewer other options for spending it, as saving is not a 
strong priority.
 
287
                                                          
283 We do not here discuss concerns about whether VSLYs enact illegal age 
discrimination. For discussion, see id. at 220. 
  Further, when valuing goods and risks in contingent 
valuation studies, people often demonstrate significant “scope 
284 REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 10, at 81 (“Relevant studies have found 
that the willingness to pay does not resemble the constant age-dependent discount 
postulated by proponents of the life-years method.”). 
285 See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 161 (finding that older people have lower 
WTP than younger people); V. Kerry Smith, Mary F. Evans, Hyun Kim & Donald 
H. Taylor, Jr., Do the Near-Elderly Value Mortality Risks Differently?,  86 REV. 
ECON. & STATISTICS 423 (2004) (finding that older people have higher WTP than 
younger people); Anna Alberini, Maureen Cropper, Alan Krupnick, & Nathalie B. 
Simon, Does the Value of a Statistical Life Vary with Age and Health Status? 
Evidence from the US and Canada, 48 J. ENVIR. ECON. & MANAGEMENT 769 (2004) 
(finding no significant difference between older and younger people).   
286 REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 10, at 80-81. 
287 Sunstein, supra note 278, at 233. 
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neglect.”  As we mentioned in Part IV.B, they are often willing to pay 
the same amount to save one thousand, ten thousand, or one hundred 
thousand birds.288
 While opponents of VSL contend that the use of VSLY exacts 
a “senior death discount”
  Plausibly, then, when 40-year-olds and 70-year-
olds are asked to value losing “the rest of your life” they may treat 
these different time periods similarly. 
289 because it treats the lives of older people 
as less valuable than those of younger people, we view this 
discrepancy as consistent with our intuitions about the remaining 
welfare associated with those lives.  Younger people will, on average, 
have greater welfare left to enjoy than do older people.  As Cass 
Sunstein has suggested, people placed behind a “veil of ignorance” 
would overwhelming favor regulations that save more life-years.290
  
  
To the extent one is trying to maximize welfare, it is better to be thirty 
years old than eighty years old. 
2. Quality Adjusted Life Years 
 
 We consider the VSLY approach to be a substantial 
improvement over the VSL technique traditionally favored by CBA.  
But while VSLY directs attention to welfare-relevant data overlooked 
by VSL, the life-years approach itself ignores a meaningful component 
of the value of risk regulation: the quality of the years saved.  As with 
the VSL approach, this has the potential to create counterintuitive 
results.  For example, the life-years approach would be indifferent 
between i) a program that extended the lives of 100 people for 10 
years with those years spent in poor health, and ii) a program that 
extended the lives of 100 people for 10 years with those years spent in 
excellent health.  Despite people’s capacity to hedonically adapt to 
certain types of poor health,291
                                                          
288 William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damage with 
Contingent Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION: 
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 91 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993). 
 there is almost certainly a greater 
289 REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 10, at 79. 
290 Sunstein, supra note 278, at 214-15 (“If people do not know how old they 
are, would they have the slightest difficulty concluding that it is better to eliminate a 
1/50,000 risk faced by one million teenagers than a 1/50,000 risk faced by one 
million senior citizens?”). 
291 John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic 
Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516 (2008). 
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welfare gain in the second program because poor health will almost 
always be associated with meaningful hedonic penalties.292
 To remedy this shortcoming, some scholars have 
recommended adopting quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) in cost-
benefit analysis.
 
293  The QALY was initially developed in the related 
field of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to provide data on the 
efficient use of scarce resources in medical decision-making.294  
Unlike the VSL and VSLY approaches, QALYs were not initially 
designed with respect to standard welfare theory,295 but some 
commentators,296 including courts297 and agencies,298 see value in the 
use of QALYs in CBA.  As yet, however, QALY analysis faces a 
number of methodological hurdles before it can be successfully 
incorporated into CBA.299
 QALY analysis requires researchers to determine the relative 
values of living in different health states.  The goal is to arrange 
various health states along a quantitative, cardinal dimension where 
1.0 is equivalent to perfect health and 0 is death.
 
300  The quality-
adjusted value of a health state is then multiplied by the number of 
life-years spent in that state to determine the QALY.301
                                                          
292 Id. 
  Thus, if a 
treatment option will extend a person’s life by 10 years but in less than 
full health (say, 0.7), it generates 7 QALYs. Such a treatment would 
be preferred over a treatment that extended a person’s life by 12 years 
at worse health (say, 0.4 = 4.8 QALYs) or one that extended the 
person’s life 5 years in full health (5 QALYs).  
293 See Sunstein, supra note 278, at 246. 
294 Milton C. Weinstein et al., QALYs: The Basics, 12 VALUE IN HEALTH S5, S5 
(2009). 
295 Amiram Gafni, Economic Evaluation of Health-care Programmes: Is CEA 
Better than CBA?, 34 ENVIR. & RESOURCE ECON. 407, 408 (2006). 
296 Adler, supra note 182, at 57. 
297 American Trucking Assoc., Inc. v. E.P.A., 175 F.3d 1027, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (suggesting that QALYs may be used by agencies to develop tools for judging 
harm). 
298 FDA, Medical Devices; Patient Examination and Surgeons' Gloves; Test 
Procedures and Acceptance Criteria, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,404 (proposed Mar, 31, 2003) 
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 800). 
299 See John Broome, Qalys, 50 J. PUB. ECON. 149 (1993). 
300 Thomas Klose, A Utility-Theoretic Model for QALYs and Willingness to Pay, 
12 HEALTH ECON. 17, 17 (2003). A QALY is “a utility-based, cardinal, 
interpersonally comparable, and time-dependent measure of effectiveness based on 
preferences over health and time.” Id. 
301 Gafni, supra note 295, at 412. 
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 In order to generate values for the necessary quality 
adjustments, researchers rely on three principle survey techniques.  
Subjects may be asked to use rating scales such as the EuroQOL 5-
item scale that asks subjects to simply compare health states that differ 
on a variety of dimensions such as pain, mobility, and self-care.302  In 
time trade-off studies, subjects are asked to choose between being in a 
state of poor health for a set period of time or being in full health for a 
shorter period.303  In “standard gamble” studies, subjects choose 
between ill health for a period of time or a treatment that has a chance 
of restoring them to full health and a chance of death.304
 The first difficulty with adopting QALY analysis as part of 
traditional CBA is determining how to monetize QALYs.  When 
QALYs are used in cost-effectiveness analysis in healthcare decision-
making, no effort is made to quantify the value of a QALY.  Instead, 
different programs may be compared to one another or a program may 
be compared to an arbitrary threshold.
  Researchers 
then use the subjects’ responses to calculate the relative value of, say, 
walking with a cane and being confined to a wheelchair. 
305  This resistance to 
quantifying the value of health and life has likely played a role in 
making QALYs attractive to healthcare professionals,306 but it has 
done so at the cost of providing a clear decision rule.307  In order to 
provide such a rule, scholars have attempted to calculate a constant 
WTP per QALY figure that can be plugged in to CBA.  As yet, 
however, no clear number has been developed.308
                                                          
302 See www.euroqol.org.  
  This difficulty may 
arise for some of the same reasons that calculating the value of a life-
303 Cam Donaldson et al., The Distributional Problem in Economic Evaluation: 
Income and the Valuation Costs and Consequences of Health Care Programmes, 11 
HEALTH ECON. 55, 60 (2002). 
304 Id. 
305 See Richard A. Hirth et al., Willingness to Pay for a Quality-adjusted Life 
Year: In Search of a Standard, 20 MED. DECISION MAKING 332, 333 (2000). 
306 Gafni, supra note 295, at 410. 
307 Hirth et al., supra note 305, at 332. 
308 Hirth et al. find WTP/QALY figures ranging from $24,000 to $428,000 with 
an average of $265,000, but they failed to find “a strong central tendency.”  Id. at 
338-39; see also Paul Dolan & Richard Edlin, Is It Really Possible to Build a Bridge 
Between Cost-Benefit Analysis and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis?, 21 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 827, 838 (2002). 
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year is a problem—framing effects, prospect theory, scarcity, and the 
like.309
 More problematic, however, is the method that researchers use 
to elicit QALY values.  Just as contingent valuation studies suffer 
from having people attach monetary values to things like health and 
the environment that are difficult to think about and monetize, QALY 
studies typically require healthy individuals to make value judgments 
about health states that they have never experienced.  To be valuable 
in welfare analysis, QALYs should reflect how people feel in various 
states of health.  Instead, when healthy people are asked about states of 
poor health they will tend to provide answers about how they feel 
about those health states.
 
310  A rich empirical literature that we have 
discussed elsewhere demonstrates individuals’ inability to accurately 
assess the value of health states they have not experienced.311  Healthy 
people regularly overestimate both the magnitude and duration of the 
hedonic impact of many negative health states, including cancer, 
dialysis treatment, paralysis, and colostomy.312  When asked to think 
about these negative health states, healthy people suffer from a 
number of cognitive and affective biases that hinder their judgment: 
they neglect the role of hedonic adaptation, they focus primarily on the 
transition from good to poor health, and their attention is focused on 
the health domain to the exclusion of other domains.313  Thus, in time 
trade-off and standard gamble studies, healthy people are willing to 
give up significantly more remaining life than are current patients.314  
This results in biased QALY scores that overestimate the welfare 
losses from many health states.315
                                                          
309 Daniel Kahneman, A Different Approach to Health State Valuation, 12 
VALUE IN HEALTH S16 (2009). 
 
310 Daniel M. Hausman, Valuing Health, 34 PHIL. & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 246, 256 
(2006). 
311 Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, Hedonic Adapation, supra note 291. 
312 For a review see Paul Dolan & Daniel Kahneman, Interpretations of utility 
and their implications for the valuation of health, 118 ECON. J. 215, 221-22 (2008). 
313 Id. at 223. 
314 See e.g., David L. Sackett & George W. Torrance, The Utility of Different 
Health States as Perceived by the General Public, 31 J. CHRONIC DISEASES 697 
(1978) (reporting QALYs for dialysis treatment of 0.39 and .056 for healthy subjects 
and patients, respectively). Often, patients are willing to sacrifice no or very little 
life, resulting in QALY scores at or near 1.0 for a variety of diseases. See Erik Nord 
et al., QALYs: Some Challenges, 12 VALUE IN HEALTH S10, S10-11 (2009). 
315 It is worth noting that other relatively minor negative health states prove 
surprisingly resistant to adaptation, such as ringing in the ears and chronic 
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 Although asking current or former patients to respond to these 
studies might help, it is unlikely to resolve all measurement issues.  
Time trade-off and standard gamble studies, like contingent valuation 
and revealed preference studies, rely on what Daniel Kahneman has 
called decision utility: subjects make judgments about the value of past 
or future states of the world.  In addition to the prediction problems 
listed above, such studies also suffer from cognitive biases associated 
with recollection of past states.  For example, colonoscopy patients 
have been shown to prefer longer, more painful procedures to shorter, 
less painful ones when the former ended with a period of diminished 
but still significant pain.316  It is also possible that current and former 
patients who are adapting or have adapted to their conditions may 
neglect the pre-adaptation period during which their condition was 
causing substantial welfare losses.317
 
 
3. Well-Being Units 
 
 Our proposal to replace CBA with WBA is based on the ability 
of WBA to solve the conceptual and methodological limitations 
associated with measuring the value of life.  WBA incorporates the 
valuable corrections offered by VSLYs and QALYs while avoiding 
their shortcomings.  As noted above, CBA’s preferred tool, the VSL, 
provides a weak proxy for general intuitions about welfare because it 
neglects data about both the longevity and quality of life.  The VSLY 
and QALY approaches go some distance toward solving this issue, but 
they run into problems of their own. 
 The well-being units (WBUs) that we propose can be thought 
of as QALYs derived from experienced utility rather than decision 
utility.  By using elicitation techniques that more or less directly 
measure subjective well-being, WBA can generate a more accurate 
measure of both the quantity and quality of the value of life.  
Ecological momentary assessment, day reconstruction method, and 
quality of life surveys provide data on the lived experiences of people 
                                                                                                                                         
headaches. To the extent that the public does not predict the substantial hedonic 
losses associated with these conditions, QALY scores will underestimate welfare 
losses. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, Hedonic Adaptation, supra note 29. 
316 Donald A. Redelmeier & Daniel Kahneman, Patients’ Memories of Painful 
Medical Treatments: Real-time and Retrospective Evaluations of Two Minimally 
Invasive Procedures, 116 PAIN 3 (1996). 
317 Dolan & Kahneman, supra note 312, at 225. 
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in a wide variety of states.318  Accordingly, they can measure the value 
of a broader spectrum of experiences, including not just health risk but 
also the impact on well-being of social, professional, and 
environmental factors.  WBA is also more attuned to the importance of 
emotional well-being, including positive emotions, which are almost 
entirely ignored by CBA.319
 In addition to proving a more nuanced and accurate picture of 
the quality of life, the techniques used by WBA avoid a number of the 
methodological problems faced by various versions of CBA.  The 
cognitive biases that hinder contingent valuation, revealed preferences, 
and QALY studies are substantially muted in WBA.  Respondents are 
only asked to answer simple questions rating their current level of 
happiness.  Such questions do not require them to value non-market 
goods, make complex health trade-offs, or predict or remember 
different experiences.  As such, they are less susceptible to wealth 
effects, demand effects, framing effects, and affective forecasting 
errors.
 
320
 Finally, because WBA does not attempt to translate 
experiences into money, it avoids difficult problems associated with 
monetizing QALYs.  In WBA, the costs and benefits of proposed 
policies are hedonized, and their impact on people’s well-being is 
weighed.  To the extent that a policy increases or decreases wealth , 
the effects of the changes in wealth on welfare will be measured 
directly ..
  Unlike traditional CBA and QALY analysis, which require 
people to make incredibly difficult judgments about the monetary or 
health value of things they have never experienced, WBA directly 
tracks people’s experiences and the emotions those experiences create. 
321
 
  Moreover, the value of a year at a certain level of well-
being is less likely to be altered by the effects of age or wealth than are 
VSLs, VSLYs, and QALYs. 
* * * 
 
                                                          
318 See supra Part I. 
319 The converse is similarly true. Matthew Adler notes that CBA analyses 
“almost never enumerate and price the distressing mental states, such as fear, 
anxiety, worry, panic, or dread, that are causally connected to environmental, 
occupational, and consumer hazards and would (or at least might) be reduced by 
more stringent regulation.”  Adler, supra note 182, at 1. 
320 See supra Part III (describing the distortions to CBA caused by these biases 
and errors). 
321 See e.g. Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 76. 
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 Previous attempts to measure the value of life for purposes of 
policy analysis have suffered from a number of conceptual and 
methodological limitations.  Although progress has been made with 
the introduction of VSLYs and QALYs, these methods still neglect 
vital information about well-being.  WBA provides methods that yield 
much closer proxies for well-being and do not suffer from the same 
biases. 
 
V.  DISCOUNTING IN CBA AND WBA 
 
 One of the most intractable problems with CBA involves the 
choice of a discount rate.322  CBA is based upon monetary values, and 
the value of money is not constant across time.323  A dollar is not 
worth the same amount in 2011 as it was in 2001, much less 1911.  It 
is better to have one dollar today than one dollar one year from today.  
In addition, governmental projects and regulations do not always 
produce benefits in the same years as they generate costs.324  For 
instance, a regulation that banned emphysema-causing chemicals in 
the workplace might create immediate costs—firms that used those 
chemicals would have to eliminate them immediately and find safer 
(and presumably more expensive) alternatives.  But the benefits would 
arrive only several years later, because emphysema is a slow-onset 
disease that typically takes years to develop.325
 The mathematics behind such discounting are easy.  What is 
difficult is determining the proper discount rate to use.  That is, how 
  CBA would thus 
measure the costs of such a regulation in 2011 dollars, and the benefits 
in (for instance) 2021 dollars, which are less valuable.  In order to 
make a true apples-to-apples comparison, the agency would then be 
forced to discount the 2021 benefits to present value—effectively 
determining what those 2021 benefits are worth in 2011 terms. 
                                                          
322 Adler & Posner, supra note 199, at 1142 (showing that agency freedom to 
chose a different discount rate for every regulation has led to large disparities in 
measuring benefits). 
323 Lisa Heinzerling, Risking It All, 57 ALA. L. REV. 103, 107–08 (2005) 
(explaining the concept of a discount rate). 
324 Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: 
Risk, Money, and Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 171, 180 (using 
arsenic as an example of regulations which would impose present costs but provide 
benefits in the form of reduced cancer rates decades in the future). 
325 See NIH, Chronic Pulmonary Obstructive Disease, available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001153/. 
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much less is a benefit in 2012 worth than a benefit in 2011?  Ten 
percent less?  Seven percent?  Five or three percent?  The answer can 
have a significant impact upon regulatory decisions.  For instance, 
consider the question of how aggressively the United States should 
regulate to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  In 2009, the Obama 
administration convened a multi-agency working group to determine 
how much harm was being done to the world economy by global 
warming on account of greenhouse gas emissions.326  The working 
group calculated the cost to the world for each ton of carbon dioxide 
emitted, in U.S. dollars.327
 
  Many of the harms from global warming 
will only occur fifty or even one hundred years from now, and so it 
was necessary to discount those harms to present-day dollars.  
However, as is often the case, the agency could not settle on a single 
discount rate.  (Below, we will explain why federal agencies are often 
incapable of coming to a conclusion about the proper discount rate.)  
Instead, it reported the cost of carbon emissions at three different 
discount rates: 2.5%, 3%, and 5%.  The results are reported in Table 1, 
below. 
Table 4: Worldwide Cost of Emitting One Ton of Carbon Dioxide at 
Various Discount Rates (in $ U.S. )328
 
 
Discount rate: 5% 3% 2.5% 
Cost: $4.90 $21.90  $35.70  
 
 As is evident from the table, the choice of discount rate has a 
tremendous effect on the estimate of harm.  Halving the discount rate, 
from 5% to 2.5%, more than septuples the cost of each ton of carbon 
dioxide.  This is because a cost that occurs in the distant future must 
be discounted many times in order to translate it into 2011 dollars—
one discounting for each year in the interim.  Over several decades, 
small differences in the discount rate compound into substantial 
divergences in overall costs.  Accordingly, it is no exaggeration to say 
that the choice between a 2.5% discount rate and a 5% discount rate 
                                                          
326 See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits 
of Cost-Benefit Analysis, ___ CAL. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2011), at *3, available 
at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1662147. 
327 See id. at *6. 
328 See id at *24. 
 
 
 
 
 WELL-BEING ANALYSIS VS. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 81 
could determine whether the United States regulates greenhouse gas 
emissions fairly stringently, or not at all.329
 Why is it difficult for agencies and other decision-makers to 
select a discount rate?  The reason is that there is no agreement about 
precisely why discounting is necessary; and even where there is 
agreement on the reasons for discounting, there is no agreement on 
what discount rate would be proper given the rationale behind 
discounting. 
 
 The predominant reason that future costs and benefits must be 
discounted is the “time value of money”—the fact that one dollar is 
not worth the same amount at every point in time.  This is partly 
because of inflation: one dollar buys fewer goods and services in 2011 
than it bought in 1911.330  It is also because money can earn interest if 
it is saved, rather than spent.  For instance, imagine a regulation that 
would require an expenditure of $10,000 in 2011 and yield $15,000 of 
benefits in 2021.  Is this regulation worth enacting?  One approach is 
to consider how much $15,000 is worth in 2021, compared with 
$10,000 in 2011.  This would involve calculating the rate of inflation 
and determining which sum of money has more purchasing power in 
the given year.  If this approach is correct, then the discount rate 
should be the long-term rate of inflation, which is approximately 
3.4%.331  Another approach is to ask how much the original $10,000 
would be worth in 2021 if it were invested, instead of being spent on 
complying with the regulation.332  If this approach is correct, then the 
discount rate should be the typical long-term rate of return on an 
investment of that size.333  There is a great deal of disagreement 
regarding what that rate of return is, but most estimates place it at 
7%.334
                                                          
329 See id. at *34 (arriving at the same conclusion); David Weisbach & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Climate Change and Discounting the Future: A Guide for the Perplexed, 
27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 433, 440 (2009). 
 
330 See United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Overview 
of BLS Statistics on Inflation and Prices, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/bls/inflation.htm. 
331 See Long Term Inflation Data, available at 
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/inflation_rate/long_term_inflation.asp. 
332 See, e.g., Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note 329, at 435-36. 
333 See generally Paul A. Samuelson, An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of 
Interest With or Without the Social Contrivance of Money, 66 J. POL. ECON. 467 
(1958). 
334 See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Circular A-94 
Revised, Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal 
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 Thus, even when the discount rate is based purely on the time 
value of money, different approaches to calculating that value can 
produce widely divergent results.  Many administrative agencies avoid 
this issue by refusing to decide between these approaches and doing 
cost-benefit analysis with both of them.  For instance, the Office of 
Management and Budget recommends that agencies use a 7% discount 
rate but perform cost-benefit analyses with both 3% and 7% discount 
rates.335  Most agencies follow this advice, including the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration and the EPA.336  Yet the choice 
among those discount rates is often determinative of whether a 
regulation produces more benefits than costs.  Consider the 
emphysema example from the previous paragraph.  At a 3% discount 
rate, the regulation would provide approximately $11,160 in benefits, 
discounted to their 2011 value.337  But at a 7% discount rate, the 
regulation provides only $7,600 in benefits—far below the $10,000 in 
costs.338
 CBA has no way to avoid these difficulties.  But WBA does.  
Unlike money, well-being is time-invariant.  Five WBUs in 2021 are 
worth just as much in welfare terms as 5 WBUs in 2011.  Indeed, the 
entire reason that the value of money varies over time is that the 
amount of well-being it can be used to purchase varies over time.  
Thus, there is no need to discount in order to accommodate the time-
value of well-being—there is no such thing.  By translating all 
quantities into WBUs, rather than into money, well-being analysis cuts 
the Gordian Knot presented by discounting.  The irresolvable 
arguments that force the EPA to report results at two different discount 
rates, and the inter-agency climate change working group to do so at 
three different rates, are simply irrelevant to WBA. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
Programs, at Sec. 8.b.1, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a094 
(1992) (“Constant-dollar benefit-cost analyses of proposed investments and 
regulations should report net present value and other outcomes determined using a 
real discount rate of 7 percent. This rate approximates the marginal pretax rate of 
return on an average investment in the private sector in recent years.”). 
335 See Arden Rowell, The Cost of Time: Haphazard Discounting and the 
Undervalued Cost of Regulatory Benefits, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1505, 1507 
(2010); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Circular A-4 on 
Regulatory Analysis 33-34 (2003). 
336 See Masur & Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, supra note 14, at 672. 
337 The calculation is $15,000 / (1.03)10 = $11,161.41. 
338 Similarly, the calculation is $15,000 / (1.07)10 = $7,625.24. 
 
 
 
 
 WELL-BEING ANALYSIS VS. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 83 
 That is not to say that WBA will necessarily be able to avoid 
discounting entirely.  We noted above that there is no agreement on 
precisely why (or whether) discounting should occur.  In the preceding 
paragraphs, we described the leading theory: inflation and the 
possibility of investment interest alter the value of money over time.  
However, there are other candidate theories that are not so easily dealt 
with by WBA.  For instance, it might be that individuals simply have 
preferences for immediate gratification over later benefits.339 Someone 
might prefer having 6 WBUs today and 5 WBUs tomorrow to the 
reverse.  This could be driven by the fear that the individual will die 
before she is able to enjoy the more distant rewards, or it could simply 
be human impatience.340  Alternatively, there might be some separate 
moral reason to privilege present welfare over future welfare (for 
example, a duty to one’s own generation), or conceivably the reverse 
(a duty to future generations).341
 We take no position on whether it is appropriate for any of 
these reasons, though we note that the case for doing so has hardly 
been established.
 
342
 
  If discounting is appropriate, then well-being 
analysis will have to include discounting as well.  But for CBA, this 
discounting would be above and beyond any discounting that might be 
necessary due to inflation and interest rates—CBA would have two 
sets of problems to sort through.  WBA simplifies the issue at least by 
half.  And when it comes to such a thorny and yet potentially decisive 
problem as what discount rate to select, that constitutes meaningful 
progress. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 For decades, cost-benefit analysis has been the primary tool by 
which policymakers analyze prospective laws and administrative 
regulations.  Hundreds of millions of lives have been affected 
                                                          
339 See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 997-1002 (1999) 
(describing the argument for pure time preferences); IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF 
INTEREST: AS DETERMINED BY IMPATIENCE TO SPEND INCOME AND OPPORTUNITY TO 
INVEST IT 25-32 (1930) (same). 
340 Revesz, supra note 339, at 997-1002. 
341 See Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note 329, at 445. 
342 See Tyler Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in 
JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 144, 155 (Peter Laslett & James 
S. Fishkin eds., 1992) (arguing that pure time preferences are irrational). 
 
 
 
 
 WELL-BEING ANALYSIS VS. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 84 
profoundly by the answers that CBA generates.  All along, critics from 
within and without have pointed to the fact that CBA relies primarily 
on mechanisms — such as contingent valuation surveys (how much 
would you pay to save 20,000 birds?) and wage premiums (how much 
more do dangerous jobs pay than safe ones?) — that have been 
demonstrated to yield unreliable and invalid data.  But CBA persists 
because no rival account has emerged to replace it. 
 We offer well-being analysis as an alternative.  WBA aims to 
measure how people actually experience their lives: what makes them 
happy and unhappy, and what they enjoy and dislike.  Instead of 
introducing the distortions created by using money as a proxy for 
people’s quality of life, WBA analyzes that quality directly.  
Psychological studies of hedonic well-being have yielded data that 
pass the same canonical tests of social science that CBA’s studies fail.  
Those hedonic studies, which form the backbone of WBA, provide the 
same capability for numerical comparison of policy choices as does 
CBA.  The difference is that WBA’s answers offer a meaningful gauge 
of the effects of prospective policies on people’s quality of life, 
whereas CBA’s answers do not. 
 Scholars, regulators, and even heads of state have known for 
years that CBA fails in its primary mission of revealing which of two 
policies is likely to make people better off in the aggregate.  But they 
have felt compelled nonetheless to accept CBA on the ground that an 
attempt at rigorous comparison is preferable to the absence of any 
comparison at all.  WBA creates the opportunity to make policy  
comparisons validly.  The question is not whether WBA is perfect—
no tool of social policy is—but rather whether it constitutes an 
improvement upon the status quo.  We find it hard to deny that the 
answer is yes. 
